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ABSTRACT 
In this study, a model for duopoly competition in the durable household goods 
market is presented. The aim is to investigate the various scenarios and policies on a 
representative dynamic model. System dynamics is used as the methodology, since it is 
an adaptive tool that allows for feedback mechanisms.  
The proposed model consists of six modules: (1) diffusion module, (2) price 
module, (3) advertising module, (4) word of mouth (WOM) module, (5) cost module, 
and (6) delivery delay module.  Diffusion module consists of innovative demand and 
imitative demand based on standard Bass model. Advertising effect constitutes the 
innovative demand whereas WOM constitutes the imitative demand. Price module 
consists of two sub modules. In the first one, the demand is treated as a function of 
price, and in the second one price setting process is modeled so a to allow for different 
pricing strategies. Diminishing returns and accumulated effects build up the advertising 
module. Conventional WOM effect is modeled in a separate module. The economies of 
scale and learning curve effects, which may lead to cost decreases during the time 
horizon, are included in the cost module. Finally, the negative effect of longer delivery 
times is modeled in the delivery delay module. These modules are replicated for the 
competitor since a duopoly market structure is investigated.  
The market consists of four segments and each segment has an associated product. 
If the product is not available in a segment, then the customers of that segment purchase 
the product from the first lower segment with product available. The customers of each 
segment have price levels for the products and a linear demand curve is used for the 
demand  - price relationship.   
The model allows for different market entry times and new product launchings. 
The necessary module replications are also performed for the entry of the second 
products (for both of the firms).   
  vii 
In the scenario analysis, various pricing strategies and different product launching 
times and new product launching decisions both in monopoly and duopoly are tested. 
The developed model produced valid and consistent results in all scenarios.  
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ÖZET 
 Bu çalismada, dayanikli tüketim mali üreten iki firmanin duopol rekabeti 
modellenmistir. Amaç çesitli senaryo ve politikalari temsili bir dinamik modelde test 
etmektir.  Metodoloji olarak, adaptif yapisindan dolayi geri besleme mekanizmalarini 
içeren sistem dinamigi kullanilmistir.  
Gelistirilen model alti modülden olusmaktadir: (1) difüzyon modülü, (2) fiyat 
modülü, (3) reklam modülü, (4) tavsiye etkisi (word of mouth) modülü, (5) maliyet 
modülü, ve (6) teslimatta gecikme modülü. Difüzyon modülü, standart Bass difüzyon 
modelinde oldugu gibi inovatif ve imitatif taleplerden olusmaktadir. Reklam etkisinden 
dolayi inovatif talep olusurken tavsiye etkisinden dolayi de imitatif talep olusmaktadir. 
Fiyat modülü iki alt modülden olusmaktadir. Ilkinde talebi fiyatin bir fonksiyonu olarak 
inceleyen mekanizma, ikincisinde ise çesitli fiyatlandirma stratejilerine izin veren 
fiyatlandirma süreci tasarlanmistir. Reklam modülünü azalan getiriler ve birikimli 
reklam etkileri olusturmaktadir. Tavsiye etkisi ayri bir modülde modellenmistir. Zaman 
içerisinde maliyette düsmelere yol açabilen ölçek ekonomisi ve ögrenme egrisi etkileri 
maliyet modülünü olusturmaktadir. Son olarak teslimatin gecikmesinden dolayi olusan 
olumsuz etkiler teslimatta gecikme modülünde modellenmistir. Duopol bir Pazar yapisi 
söz konusu oldugundan bahsedilen modüller rakip için de tekrarlanmistir.  
Pazar dört katmandan olusmaktadir ve her katmana hitap eden ayri bir ürün vardir. 
Eger bir katmanda ürün mevcut degilse, o katmanin müsterileri taleplerini ürünü mevcut 
olan ilk alt katmandan karsilamaktadirlar. Her katmanin müsterileri ilgili ürün için bir 
fiyat seviyesine sahiptirler ve fiyat talep iliskisi de dogrusal bir islevle modele 
yansitilmaktadir. 
Model firmalarin farkli zamanlarda pazara ürün sürmelerine ve yeni ürün pazara 
sürmelerine olanak saglamaktadir. Gerekli modül tekrarlamalari her iki firmayi da 
kapsayacak sekilde, yeni ürünler için de yapilmistir.  
  ix 
Senaryo analizinde, çesitli fiyatlandirma stratejileri ve monopolde ve duopolde 
yeni ürün pazara sürme kararlari test edilmistir. Tüm senaryolarin sonucunda gelistirilen 
model ile geçerli ve tutarli sonuçlar elde edilmistir. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this study, a model for duopoly competition in the durable household goods 
market is presented. The aim is to investigate the various scenarios and policies on a 
representative dynamic model. System dynamics is used as the methodology, since it is 
an adaptive tool that allows for feedback mechanisms.  
The proposed model consists of six modules: (1) diffusion module, (2) price 
module, (3) advertising module, (4) word of mouth (WOM) module, (5) cost module, 
and (6) delivery delay module.  Diffusion module consists of innovative demand and 
imitative demand based on standard Bass model. Advertising effect constitutes the 
innovative demand whereas WOM constitutes the imitative demand. Price module 
consists of two sub modules. In the first one, the demand is treated as a function of 
price, and in the second one price setting process is modeled so a to allow for different 
pricing strategies. Diminishing returns and accumulated effects build up the advertising 
module. Conventional WOM effect is modeled in a separate module. The economies of 
scale and learning curve effects, which may lead to cost decreases during the time 
horizon, are included in the cost module. Finally, the negative effect of longer delivery 
times is modeled in the delivery delay module. These modules are replicated for the 
competitor since a duopoly market structure is investigated.  
The market consists of four segments and each segment has an associated product. 
If the product is not available in a segment, then the customers of that segment purchase 
the product from the first lower segment with product available. The customers of each 
segment have price levels for the products and a linear demand curve is used for the 
demand  - price relationship.   
The model allows for different market entry times and new product launchings. 
The necessary module replications are also performed for the entry of the second 
products (for both of the firms).   
  vii 
In the scenario analysis, various pricing strategies and different product launching 
times and new product launching decisions both in monopoly and duopoly are tested. 
The developed model produced valid and consistent results in all scenarios.  
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ÖZET 
 Bu çalismada, dayanikli tüketim mali üreten iki firmanin duopol rekabeti 
modellenmistir. Amaç çesitli senaryo ve politikalari temsili bir dinamik modelde test 
etmektir.  Metodoloji olarak, adaptif yapisindan dolayi geri besleme mekanizmalarini 
içeren sistem dinamigi kullanilmistir.  
Gelistirilen model alti modülden olusmaktadir: (1) difüzyon modülü, (2) fiyat 
modülü, (3) reklam modülü, (4) tavsiye etkisi (word of mouth) modülü, (5) maliyet 
modülü, ve (6) teslimatta gecikme modülü. Difüzyon modülü, standart Bass difüzyon 
modelinde oldugu gibi inovatif ve imitatif taleplerden olusmaktadir. Reklam etkisinden 
dolayi inovatif talep olusurken tavsiye etkisinden dolayi de imitatif talep olusmaktadir. 
Fiyat modülü iki alt modülden olusmaktadir. Ilkinde talebi fiyatin bir fonksiyonu olarak 
inceleyen mekanizma, ikincisinde ise çesitli fiyatlandirma stratejilerine izin veren 
fiyatlandirma süreci tasarlanmistir. Reklam modülünü azalan getiriler ve birikimli 
reklam etkileri olusturmaktadir. Tavsiye etkisi ayri bir modülde modellenmistir. Zaman 
içerisinde maliyette düsmelere yol açabilen ölçek ekonomisi ve ögrenme egrisi etkileri 
maliyet modülünü olusturmaktadir. Son olarak teslimatin gecikmesinden dolayi olusan 
olumsuz etkiler teslimatta gecikme modülünde modellenmistir. Duopol bir Pazar yapisi 
söz konusu oldugundan bahsedilen modüller rakip için de tekrarlanmistir.  
Pazar dört katmandan olusmaktadir ve her katmana hitap eden ayri bir ürün vardir. 
Eger bir katmanda ürün mevcut degilse, o katmanin müsterileri taleplerini ürünü mevcut 
olan ilk alt katmandan karsilamaktadirlar. Her katmanin müsterileri ilgili ürün için bir 
fiyat seviyesine sahiptirler ve fiyat talep iliskisi de dogrusal bir islevle modele 
yansitilmaktadir. 
Model firmalarin farkli zamanlarda pazara ürün sürmelerine ve yeni ürün pazara 
sürmelerine olanak saglamaktadir. Gerekli modül tekrarlamalari her iki firmayi da 
kapsayacak sekilde, yeni ürünler için de yapilmistir.  
  ix 
Senaryo analizinde, çesitli fiyatlandirma stratejileri ve monopolde ve duopolde 
yeni ürün pazara sürme kararlari test edilmistir. Tüm senaryolarin sonucunda gelistirilen 
model ile geçerli ve tutarli sonuçlar elde edilmistir. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Increased competition and variety in customer orders lead to complex 
environments to be dealt with for industrial firms. In general, the number of entitie s and 
the interactions between these entities increase in such complex environments leading to 
uncertainty in decision-making. 
Daft (1998) states that “Uncertainty increases the risk of failure for organizational 
responses and makes it difficult to compute costs and probabilities associated with 
decision alternatives.”  Also Dessler (1998) mentions the difficulty of managing in a 
dynamic environment. However, there is no escape from these complicated systems, in 
which decision-making under uncertainty becomes a challenge.  To build representative 
models for selected complex problems is a challenging research area as they investigate 
such situations and allows for various policies. 
The subject of this study arises from this challenge. The investigation of duopoly 
competition in the durable household goods market is the starting point of this study. 
The durable household goods market is selected for investigation, since this market is 
an important one in Turkey. Although the durable household goods market is a mature 
market in the world, new product developments and related R&D studies still provide 
opportunities for growth in this market.  
In this study, the main functional modules such as marketing, human resources, 
and finance are not considered. Instead, the  decision mechanisms of selected functions 
are included in order to keep the model simple. 
First, the diffusion framework, which builds a base for the selected decision 
mechanisms, is included along with the selected marketing activities (advertising and 
pricing).  The positive effect of word of mouth, the negative effect of delivery delay, 
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strategic decisions on capacity, possible cost reductions are the other selected decision 
mechanisms included in the model.  
In summary, in this study, a representative model that allows testing various 
policies (such as different pricing strategies and time to market decisions) in a duopoly 
competition in durable household goods market is developed with selected decision 
mechanisms.  
The organization of this study is as follows: Chapter 2 states the approach and the 
methodology behind the model. Chapter 3 explains the model and its modules. Chapter 
4 deals with the validity of the model and sensitivity analysis for the selected 
parameters. Chapter 5 represents the scenarios along with the results and finally Chapter 
6 states the conclusions and future research. 
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2. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to build a model as defined in the previous section, the approach to the 
model structure and methodology must be clarified.  
In terms of the approach, the way the model structure defined should be stated. 
Should we design a totally open-adaptive system or should we set boundaries? Before, 
answering this question, a brief definition of these terms would be appropriate.  
The closed system is a group of interacting elements that do not exchange 
information, energy, and materials with its environment. In these systems, the 
predictions can be made relatively easier due to restricted relationships and the system’s 
deterministic structure. However, these predictions do not reflect the rational results and 
actions for the future of the company, and the possible results for a strategic decision is 
hard to examine and consider. Therefore, such systems are unable to provide a totally 
dynamic structure.  
On the other hand, an open system view may result in more complex models for 
the organization, which allow any kind of interaction with its environment. Such 
systems are not deterministic and predictions are harder to make in closed systems. This 
increases the complexity of the model structure and analysis of the results. However, an 
increased amount of effort and research for the analysis generally results with rational 
policies and strategies for the company. In general, organizations and the models are not 
structured as a totally open system in order to decrease complexity and the number of 
parameters. The designs are tailored to reflect the purpose of the study and the priorities 
among the members of the environment.  
Boone and Kurtz (1992) state some additional characteristics of open systems as 
follows:  
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Table 2-1 Characteristics of the open systems (Adopted from Boone and Kurtz, 1992) 
Characteristic Brief Description 
Cycle of events Process by which an open system receives inputs from its 
environment, transforms them, and generates output. 
Negative entropy The ability of a system to repair itself, survive, and grow by 
importing resources from its environment and transforming 
them into outputs 
Feedback mechanisms An open systems component that informs the organization of 
deviations from objectives 
Dynamic homeostasis Process by which open systems maintain equilibrium over a 
period of time 
Differentiation Structural force in organizations whereby the system develops 
specialized functions among its various components 
Equifinality Principle that open systems can achieve their objectives 
through several different courses of action 
A system becomes adaptive if there are interactions with the environment that 
provide feedback to the system and the system itself produces the proper corrections 
from the mechanism in order to respond to the feedback. Moreover, a balance between 
the corrections and the feedback has to be reached in order to continue this relationship.  
Adaptive organizations are essential mostly in dynamic environments, in which 
reinforcing and balancing relationships arise. According to the changes in the 
environment, the system produces the most appropriate response to the environment and 
reaches a balance. Figure 2-2 illustrates an adaptive system that responds to the 
environmental conditions. 
These definitions solve the problem of determining the model structure. Since our 
aim is to investigate and discuss possible scenarios, possible external effects, we need to 
build an open-adaptive system. However, as mentioned earlier, a totally adaptive system 
is really hard to control and test. Therefore, in order to measure the internal effects 
precisely, we carefully insert external effects. The external effect refers to the effect 
whose dynamic is not totally designed within the model. In other words, the advertising 
effect can also be an external one unless the entire dynamics, which generate 
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advertising decisions and effects, are designed within the model. In summary, the model 
used in the thesis, is an adaptive and controllable open  (not totally) system. 
System dynamics, as the preferred methodology, enhances the learning in 
complex systems since it allows simulation. During the simulation, this flexible and 
adaptive tool –system dynamics– generates the behavior of the system within the 
defined boundaries and endogenous entities based on the pre-defined relationships and 
feedback structure. Lyneis (2000) summarizes the main characteristics of system 
dynamics as follows: “(1) system dynamics models can provide more reliable forecasts 
of short- to mid-term trends than statistical models and therefore lead to better 
decisions; (2) system dynamics models provide a means of understanding the causes of 
industry behavior, and thereby allow early detection of changes in industry structure and 
the determination of factors to which forecast behavior are significantly sensitive; and 
(3) system dynamics models allow the determination of reasonable scenarios as inputs 
to decisions and policies.”  
However, it should be noted that system dynamics serves the purpose, if and only 
if, the real conditions and relationships are modeled, and boundaries are drawn 
attentively. The modeller should reflect the real conditions as much as is possible. Any 
absent or inaccurate information may lead to a completely different simulation and 
conclusions.  
This methodology not only allows representing material flows within a system but 
also allows information flows that lead to possible changes in managerial perceptions 
that influence decisions (Figure 2-1). The absence of such a property, in other words, 
without the inclusion of the human factor, it is impossible to reflect the real world. 
Figure 2-1 Interactions with the environment - information flow (Kast and 
Rosenzweig, 1985) 
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Figure 2-2 Totally adaptive system (Hodgetts, 1986)
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3. MODEL 
Marketing-production interface and related policies are the basic issues that affect 
the structure of the market and the company profile. This interface is quite complex and 
hard to design all at once. Therefore, the model is divided into logical modules and 
designed sequentially based on various earlier models and research. The modules are as 
follows: 
· Diffusion module 
· Price module 
· Advertising module 
· Word of mouth module 
· Cost module 
· Delivery delay module 
Note that the market structure used in this thesis is explained in Section 3.8. The 
relationships under a predefined market structure are illustrated in Figure 3-1. It is 
assumed that all of the l dynamics and relationships are valid for the competitor as well. 
Price and unique potential customers are the key factors that generate the competition. 
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Figure 3-1 Modules and interactions in the model 
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3.1. Diffusion  
The product life cycle is the main concept dependent on the characteristics of 
companies and the market. This curve represents the behavior of the product during the 
time horizon. In the business world, the main phases of product cycle are known as 
introduction, growth, maturity, and decline. In each stage, different marketing and 
production strategies should be followed based on the product and market 
characteristics. For example, a company producing high-tech products should introduce 
successive generations before its competitors do, in order to prevent sharp decreases in 
the diffusion curve. Sometimes aggressive marketing decisions may lead even to 
deformations in this curve. An early introduction of a new product that substitutes the 
firm’s current product may unexpectedly decrease sales. Price decisions, advertising, 
distribution, availability, quality, and product capabilities are some of the factors that 
affect the structure of the life cycle. Therefore, product life cycle - in other words, the 
diffusion of products or purchase decisions- is quite a complex and dynamic concept in 
industry. 
 The main factors affecting product diffusion process can be displayed in four 
groups: (1) the market structure (competition arises in duopoly markets); (2) 
management decisions (quality, price, advertising, product capabilities, technical know-
how through R&D, market entry time, delivery delay, and related capacity decisions); 
(3) general aspects of innovation diffusion (repeat purchases, substitution, dynamic 
market potential, and negative word of mouth); (4) the innovation itself (carry-over 
effects from earlier periods) (Maier, 1998) Since all of these factors affecting the 
diffusion process purchase of a product are more complicated than the spread of a 
disease, so specific models should be developed for different combinations of factors.  
 Studies for modelling the diffusion of products began with Fourt and Woodlock in 
1960 and Mansfield in 1961; Bass Diffusion Model believed to be the base of the 
diffusion models was developed by Bass in 1969. After that, these models are 
repeatedly tested and developed under various assumptions and conditions. A brief 
summary of this long journey is presented below. 
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 Fourt and Woodlock (1960) develop a mathematical equation with the following 
assumptions: (1) there exists a maximum number of potential buyers-defined as the 
ceiling of the penetration, and (2) in each period the increase in the penetration depends 
on the remaining potential buyers. The model developed includes parameters of a 
constant purchasing probability and the ceiling. Equation (3.1) displays the purchase 
behavior in period i, where x is the ceiling on maximum number of potential customers, 
and r is the constant probability of purchase.  
  ( )iS(T=i)=rx 1-r    i = 0,1,2,3….. (3.1) 
Mansfield (1961) studied the effect of imitation among the firms and the diffusion 
of new technology based on this imitation and conc ludes that the probability of 
imitation –a firm’s introduction of a new technology- is positively correlated with the 
number of earlier imitators and the profitability of this new technology but negatively 
correlated with the investment required by the technology involved.  
Although Mansfield (1961) investigated such a relationship among the firms in an 
industry, his research has significantly contributed to the new product diffusion studies 
in terms of realizing the effects of innovators and early adopters of a new product. In 
fact, the diffusion of a technology in an industry resembles the diffusion of a new 
product in a market since they both have similar characteristics. 
The most widely used mathematical model is the standard Bass growth model, 
which basically investigates the timing of initial purchases rather than of repeat 
purchases. However, the consecutive models developed by Bass and other researchers 
have captured different conditions under various assumptions, such as the presence of a 
competitor, repeat purchases, and successive generations.   
The basic Bass model includes two fundamental characteristics of diffusion 
process: innovation and imitation, which are also studied separately by Fourt and 
Woodlock (1960) and Mansfield (1961).  According to Bass (1969), some individuals 
make purchases independent from other potential adopters in the system. These 
individuals are named as innovators, and therefore, this purchase is called an innovative 
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purchase. Sterman (2000) defines this approach of Bass as the solution for the start-up 
problem. The remaining individuals in the system are called imitators since their 
decision depends on the previous adopters and the characteristics of the product. These 
two flows are formulated as follows: 
 
 ( ) [ ]1S t =p* m-F(t)     Innovative purchase (3.2) 
 ( ) [ ] [ ]2S t = q*(F(t)/m) * m-F(t)   Imitative purchase  (3.3) 
        ( ) [ ] [ ]S t = q*(F(t)/m)+p * m-F(t)                  (3.4) 
 
where: 
S(t) : The number of new trials at time t (sales at time t) 
m : Market potential (assumed as constant) 
F(t) : Cumulative number of trails up to time t 
p : Coefficient of innovation 
q : Coefficient of imitation. 
 
The model can be reduced to that of Fourt and Woodlock (1960) if the coefficient 
of imitation is set to zero, and to that of Mansfield (1961) if the coefficient of 
innovation is set to zero.  
After numerous applications, the basic Bass model fit is validated and the 
principle behind the model has been widely accepted in the marketing field. However, 
for some cases, the initial Bass model becomes insufficient. For example, it does not 
include the effect of pricing, successive generations, repeat purchases, and so on. 
Therefore, many models have been developed for special purposes and cases without 
violating the principle of imitation and innovation effects within the basic Bass model.  
The study performed by Mahajan and Peterson (1978) points out that the total 
potential adopters can be modelled dynamically. The change in population, marketing 
activities, and government policy are some of the basic reasons behind the change in the 
number of total potential adopters. The model developed has produced valid results for 
the growth of the sales of washing machines in the US.  
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The case of successive generations is handled by Norton and Bass (1987). The 
Norton- Bass model assumes that the newer generation may widen the potential market 
just for this product and discusses two possible results with the entry of a new 
generation to the market.  The purchasers who would have bought the older version may 
adopt the newer one instead. In other words, the entry of a new generation can decrease 
the potential customers desiring to buy the older product. The second case is the switch 
case. The customers already adopting the older version can make a repeat purchase and 
switch to the new product. The Norton-Bass model is developed based on these 
assumptions and possibilities. The equations for a two generation case are shown in 
equations (3.5) and (3.6).  
 
[ ]1 1 1 2 2S(t)=F(t)m 1-F (t-t )        for t > 0 where F2(t-t2) = 0 for t < t2 (3.5) 
  
 2 2 2 2 1 1S (t)=F (t-t )[m +F(t)m ]   for t > t2  (3.6) 
 
where: 
Si (t) = Sales of generation i at time t, i = 1,2 
Fi (t) = Cumulative adoption function of generation i 
mi = Level of potential adopters reached after the entry of generation i (not willing to 
adopt the generations < i)   
ti  = Market entry time for generation i.  
In equation (3.5), the total sales of generation 2 consist of two groups: (1) people 
making their initial purchase due to the entry of that generation m2 and (2) those 
adopting the earlier versions making a repeat purchase previously named as switch case.   
The Norton-Bass model designed for a monopoly market handles repeat purchase 
in a different manner. A switch case is defined as a repeat purchase and specific to high-
tech products. The case of repeat purchase is included in the model developed by Bass 
and Bass (2001). In the model, repeat purchase and initial purchase are separated. This 
model has assumptions for high-tech products and a complicated repeat purchase flow.  
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 Successive generations and substitutions among these generations are also 
investigated by Maier (1998). In this model, a system dynamics based map is 
constructed and the generic properties of diffusion process as well as substitutions 
among successive generations are defined. All successive generations compete for a 
unique aggregate pool unlike the Norton-Bass Model. In Norton-Bass, each 
generation’s potential customers are separated. The model also allows for repeat 
purchase, which occurs at the end of the average life time of a generation. However, it 
should be noted that the basic diffusion function is constructed based on Bass model.  
Maier (1998) also deals with competition among companies. The model mainly 
includes the imitative demand and innovative demand introduced by Bass. In contrast to 
the Norton-Bass model, this model allows for several firms to be active in the market at 
any given time. The main assumption is that the active competitors have the same 
market share unless they do not perform different marketing strategies and decisions, 
which alter purchase probability.  
 
(3.7) 
 
(3.8) 
 
 
where: 
ai = Coefficient of innovation of company i (i = 1,2,…,K) 
b i = Coefficient of imitation of company i (i = 1,2,…,K) 
 
fi =               
 
NC = å
=
k
i
i
1
f     Number of total active companies 
adopi = Number of total adopters of company i 
N = Initial value of market potential 
m = Remaining market potential  
K = Total number of companies. 
1, if company is active in the market (present in the market) 
0, if company is not active in the market  
i i iinnovativedemand =(a /NC)*m*f
i i i iimitativedemand =(ß*f /N)*adop*m
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In the equations stated above, the subscript i represents the ith company in the 
market, and as mentioned earlier, the binary variable Fi controls the presence of the 
company in the market. The improved version of this model includes the issue of 
customer loyalty.  
3.1.1. The Diffusion Module 
The Bass diffusion model constitutes the basic framework of the diffusion 
module. As mentioned in the earlier sections, which discuss the basic principles and 
various extensions on base Bass model, the effect of imitators and innovators builds two 
main functions in the module. The word of mouth effect creates an imitative demand, 
whereas the advertising effect creates an innovative one. 
There are various researches that investigate the relationship between advertising 
and innovative behavior, such as Robinson and Lakhani (1975), Horsky and Simon 
(1983), Kalish and Lilien (1986), Simon and Sebastian (1987). Advertising has been 
agreed upon as the activity that creates innovative demand in the above research and 
therefore this effect is included in a similar manner to this study. 
The inclusion of the word of mouth (WOM) effect was significant due to product 
type, which is a durable household good. The purchase decision and duration is more 
complicated than in a frequently purchased non-durable item due to higher price and 
risk. Therefore, the experience of early adopters has become essential.  
Finally the effect of delivery delay is included. This factor becomes an efficiency 
multiplier on the total effect of innovative and imitative purchase. As waiting time 
increases, the efficiency decreases based on a graph that is represented in the delivery 
delay module.   
The effect of price is also included in the model. However, this effect is carried to 
the diffusion model indirectly so related explanations are represented in other modules.  
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 The diffusion module is illustrated in Figure 3-2. As mentioned above, the price 
effect is carried through advertising and WOM modules. Converters named as FAE 1, 
WOME 1, and FDDE 1 represent these three factors sequentially. The firm’s aggregate 
effect identified as FAgE 1 sums up these three factors. The numbers at the end of the 
converters or stocks stand for the product sequence. For example, all 1’s in Figure 3-2 
represent the diffusion process for the firm’s first product. Initial letters stand for the 
company with  “F” representing firm and “C” representing competitor.  
 
 
Figure 3-2 Diffusion module  
The customers deciding to purchase the product based on the diffusion factors 
leave the potential customers’ pool (PC) and come to the backlog stock (FB 1). This 
backlog stock will also be used in the future as a part of delivery delay control 
mechanism.  Powell et al. (2001) also mention that backlog is a more robust metric for 
performance measurement even for unpredictable environments. Note that the 
customer’s flow from PC stock to IB stock depends on the capacity. This issue is 
explained at the end of this section.  
After backlog stock, these customers’ orders are shipped, and this rate becomes 
sales. Then these customers become a part of the installed base (FIB 1) as long as the 
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capacity allows. The accumulated customers in the backlog stock due to restricted 
capacity become an input to the delivery delay module, and, in the following cycles, this 
accumulation negatively affects the diffusion.  The flows and stock equations are 
represented through Equations (3.9) and (3.16). 
  PC.K = PC.J + (PC_Increase_Flow.JK + FdiscardF_1.JK – FDF.JK)*DT (3.9) 
  PC_Increase_Flow.KL = Net_Increase.K (3.10) 
  FdiscardF_1.KL = FIB_1.K / AL (3.11) 
  FDF.JK = FAgE_1.K (3.12) 
  FAgE_1.K = (FAE_1.K + FWOME_1.K) * FDDE_1.K (3.13) 
  FB_1.K = FB_1.J + (FDF_1.JK – FS_1.JK)*DT (3.14) 
  FS_1.KL = MIN(FB_1.K / DT, FCap_1.K) (3.15) 
  FIB_1.K = FIB_1.J + (FS_1.JK – FdiscardF_1.JK)*DT (3.16) 
 
where: 
PC.K : Potential customers (customers1) 
PC_Increase_Flow.KL : Total number of increase in potential customers per year 
(customers/year) 
Net_Increase.KL : Net increase in potential customers per year (customers/year) 
FdiscardF_1.KL : Total number of discards per year (customers/year) 
FDF.KL : Firm’s demand flow per year (customers/year) 
FAgE_1.K: Firm’s aggregate effect for the first product per year (customers/year) 
FAE_1.K: Firm’s advertising effect per year (customers/year) 
FWOME_1.K: Word of mouth effect for firm per year (customers/year) 
FDDE_1.K: Firm’s delivery delay effect (dimensionless) 
FB_1.K: Firm’s backlog (customers) 
FS_1.KL: Firm’s sales per year (customers/year) 
FCap_1.K: Firm’s capacity per year (customers/year)  
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FIB_1.K: Firm’s installed base (customers) 
DT: Delta time 
The unit conversion Backlog/DT in equation (3.15) is essential since the units of 
capacity and backlog stock are not identical. The unit of flows always should be 
flow/period. 
The installed base is a critical stock since it is both essential in the determination 
of the market share and the WOM effect. The effected customers reinforce the new 
purchases.   
The repeat purchase is another issue handled in the model. After the completion of 
the average lifetime, the customers again purchase the product. It is assumed that on the 
average, the product serves the purpose during its lifetime. The inclusion of the repeat 
purchase in the model satisfies the continuity of the cycle. Because of the limited life of 
the product, the customers return to the potential customers’ pool and the cycle goes on 
with repeat purchases (Equation (3.11)).  
The total number of potential customers is modeled dynamically. In the study, 
each potential customer stands for a family therefore, the total number of customers 
represents the total number of households. Static modeled potential customers would 
not reflect real world conditions and, therefore, would be a non-realistic assumption as 
stated in Mahajan and Peterson (1978). 
 The customers’ stock increases based on the net increase rate, gathered from 
statistics. Since the stock continually changes, the total number of customers is 
controlled by a separate stock, and the related increase rate is then carried through 
Figure 3-2 by converter Net Increase.  As illustrated in Figure 3-3, the total potential 
customers are held separately, and the net increase is calculated by this separate pool.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
1 Customers also represent the orders since each customer buys one unit of 
product. 
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Figure 3-3 Increase in potential customers  
  PC_Total.K = PC_Total.J + (PC_Inc_Rate.JK)*DT (3.17) 
  Net_Increase.K = PC_Total.JK*NIR (3.18) 
  PC_Inc_Rate.KL = PC_Total.K*NIR (3.19) 
where: 
PC_Total.K: Total potential customers (customers) 
PC_Inc_Rate.JK: Total number of increase in potential customers per year 
(customers/year) 
Net_Increase: Net increase in potential customers per year (customers/year) 
Figure 3-5 is valid for the situation in which two firms’ products are identical. 
Note that, the inclusion of a competitor with an identical product would change the 
dynamic structure. Therefore, the firms cannot be modeled independently because each 
firm will compete for the same potential customers. However, in the competition in 
which two products are not identical, independently replicated modules would work 
since their potential customers would not be alike.  The diffusion process is the same as 
the former case (with different products). However, the outflow from potential 
customers will differ. The allocation is based on the comparison of the two firms’ 
aggregate effects. Also, the terms “firm industry demand” and “competitor industry 
demand” are introduced. These demands are explained in the price module in more 
detail. However, it can be said briefly that they represent the small set of potential 
customers who are willing to adopt the product at a given price level. If these industry 
demands overlap, i.e., if there are customers who can purchase either from the firm or 
the competitor, then their relative effects should be compared. If they do not overlap, 
then as in as the previous case, the aggregate effects are valid. Equation (3.20) displays 
this allocation. 
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FDF_1.K = IF ((FAgE_1.K/FID_1.K) + (CagE_1.K/CID_1.K)) > 1 THEN 
IF CID_1.K<FID_1.K THEN ((FAgE_1.K/(CagE_1.K + FAgE_1.K))*CID_1.K 
+ (FAgE_1.K/FID_1.K)*(FID_1.K – CID_1.K)) 
ELSE ((FAgE_1.K/(CagE_1.K + FAgE_1.K))*FID_1.K) 
ELSE FAgE_1.K (3.20) 
In summary, if two firms launch different products, the module represented in 
Figure 3-2 can be replicated independently. However, since identical products would 
cause interactions, this replication will not work, and a structure as represented in 
Figure 3-5 would be appropriate. In Figure 3-5, both firms compete for a unique 
potential customers stock and the firms’ customers are determined based on the 
comparison of the two firms’ aggregate effects.     
As mentioned earlier, the customers’ flow from PC Stock to IB stock totally 
depends on the capacity and capacity decisions.  If there is one product, then an 
allocation problem will not occur. However, if there are two products, then allocation 
will become an important decision to consider.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4 Capacity allocation 
For the allocation, the presence of the second product is checked initially, and 
then the total required products are checked whether the sum exceeds the total capacity 
or not. If both products are in the market and total demand does not exceed the total 
capacity, then the necessary units are allocated, and the idle remaining capacity is 
shared between the two products. However, if the total demand exceeds the total 
capacity, then the profitability of products are compared with the difference between 
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their backlog and assigned capacity. Equations (3.21)-(3.25) display the stated 
allocation strategy. The related figure is represented in Figure 3-4. 
FICA.K = IF FB_1.K > 0 AND FB_2.K > 0 THEN IF (FB_1.K/DT + FB_2.K/DT) > 
FTC THEN (MAX(0,(FB_1.K-DT*FCap_1.K))*FUp_1.K) /(MAX(0,(FB_1.K-
DT*FCap_1.K))*FUp_1.K+ (MAX(0,FB_2.K-DT*FCap_2.K))*FUp_2.K) ELSE       
((FB_1.K/DT)/FTC + (1-(FB_1.K/DT)/FTC-(FB_2.K/DT)/FTC)/2) ELSE 1         (3.21) 
  FCA_Flow.KL = FICA.K – FCA.K (3.22) 
  FCA.K = FCA.J + (FCA_Flow.JK)*DT (3.23) 
  FCAP_1.K = FCA.K*FTC  (3.24) 
  FCAP_2.K = (1 – FCA.K)*FTC  (3.25) 
where: 
FICA.K: Firm’s indicated capacity allocation (dimensionless) 
FTC: Firm’s total capacity (products) 
FUp_1.K: Firm’s unit profit for the first product (dollars) 
FUp_2.K: Firm’s unit profit for the second product (dollars) 
FCap_1.K: Firm’s first product’s capacity (products) 
FCap_2.K: Firm’s second product’s capacity (products) 
FCA_Flow.KL: Firm’s capacity allocation ratio flow (1/years) 
FCA.K: Firm’s capacity allocation ratio (dimensionless) 
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Figure 3-5 Diffusion module for identical products 
3.2. Pricing  
Price strategy and related dynamics have a vital importance in a competitive 
environment, since it drives the potential customers and firm’s income. Price can affect 
the whole system from two different aspects: market as a function of price and price 
setting. 
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3.2.1. Market as a Function of Price 
In the literature, many researchers treat the market as a function of price. Since 
many social and economic changes affect potential customers and sales, price can also 
affect the number of potential customers. In the study performed by Mahajan and 
Peterson (1978), the relationship between the population of the social system and the 
growth of total potential customers (for the washing machine market) are explored and a 
strong correlation is found. Therefore, total potential customers are represented as a 
function of social system population.     
After that study, Kalish and Lilien (1986) designed the potential market as a 
function of price. According to their model, declining prices allow more customers to 
enter the market. In the model, the cons tant m (potential customers) of Bass’ model is 
redesigned as follows: 
    [ ]m= N(t)*h(p)      (3.26) 
where: 
m: Potential adopters in base Bass Model 
N(t): Market potential as a function of time when price is 0  
p = p(t): Price as a function of time 
h(p): Fraction of market potential, N(t), that finds price, p, acceptable. 
 
Sterman (2000) also deals with the dynamics of price. The main points supported 
are as follows: (1) industry demand changes with price, (2) demand does not fall below 
zero when price is too high, and (3) demand never becomes infinite when price is too 
low but remains less than a specified constant.  
In his study, a dynamic demand model is designed based on price. In the model, 
reference price, reference industry demand elasticity, price, maximum consumption, and 
demand adjustment delay are exogenous. Entities that build industry demand by various 
equations. 
    DCS = –R ID * RIDE / RP    (3.27) 
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        IID = MIN [MaxCon, RID*MAX(0, 1  DCS*(P – RP)/RID]  (3.28) 
Then IID reduces to;  
        IID = MIN [MaxCon, RID*MAX(0, 1 – RIDE*(P – RP)/RP] (3.29) 
                                  ID = SMOOTH (IID, DAD) (3.30) 
where: 
DCS: Demand curve slope 
RID: Reference industry demand 
RIDE: Reference industry demand elasticity  
RP: Reference price 
P: Price 
IID: Indicated industry demand 
ID: Industry demand 
DAD: Demand adjustment delay 
MaxCon: Upper bound for the demand when price is too low. 
 
According to these equations, the demand decreases when the price is higher than 
the reference price. In the worst case, the demand can take the value of zero. On the 
other hand, when price is lower than the reference price, the demand can be equal to the 
maximum consumption level, at most.  
The existence of demand elasticity, reference price, and reference demand 
strengthen this model, since these variables are the main entities in economic models. 
Briefly, demand elasticity is the fractional change in demand for a given fractional 
change in price. Generally, in economic models there is a nonlinear relationship 
between price and demand. However, in contrast to economic models, Sterman (2000) 
relates demand and elasticity linearly (Equations (3.27) - (3.30)). Since, this model is 
still valid for extreme conditions (when price is zero or infinite), the simplicity of 
linearity seems acceptable. In his text, Sterman (2000) also explains this issue in detail.  
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3.2.2. Price-Setting 
Pricing process is still a challenge in the industry. The main point that makes price 
such a challenge is its properties that differentiate it from other marketing mix variables. 
Rao (1984) summarizes these properties of pricing as: (1) the only marketing mix 
variable which generate revenues; (2) having a direct and immediate effect, ie., to 
change price is easier than to change product specifications; and (3) making 
communication easier, prospective customers react price immediately.  
Many issues have to be dealt during this process, such as the structure of price 
(dynamic or not), cost effects, company strategy, competitors’ strategy, customer 
expectation, and other possible events that may lead to strategy differentiation during 
the time horizon. Rao (1984) adopts a framework, which consists of factors affecting 
price and makes this process a part of overall marketing strategy. The framework is 
depicted in Figure 3-6.   
The main issue to be identified is the structure of the price (static or dynamic). 
Robinson and Lakhani (1975) criticize the conventional price theory, which assumes 
static price under strict conditions (static market and production environments) on the 
short term. After that, they discuss the effects of learning curve effect and economies of 
scale, which force price to be dynamic.  
Milling (1996) also supports dynamic price. In his study, four main pricing 
strategies are investigated and simulated for a specific model. Briefly, these strategies 
are: (1) myopic profit maximization: an optimal price is derived from elasticity and 
standard costs; (2) skimming price strategy: an optimal price is reduced by a simple 
reduction strategy through the time horizon; (3) full cost coverage: price is based on 
standard cost per unit and a profit margin and (4) penetration pricing: similar to 
skimming strategy, but here prices are more rapidly decreased in order to capture the 
advantage of the learning curve effect in the earlier stages. In his simulation, penetration 
pricing is found as the best strategy among the four. 
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Figure 3-6 Price decision process for a new product (Adopted by Rao (1984) from 
Cravens (1982)) 
The study performed by Noble and Gruca (1999) provides a framework for 
industrial goods pricing. They group pricing strategies under some environmental 
conditions (e.g. a new product, a substitute). Pricing situations are determined as new 
product, competitive, product line, and cost-based. The strategies related to the 
situations are as follows:  
· New product pricing situation: price skimming, penetration pricing and 
experience curve pricing.  
· Competitive pricing situation: Leader pricing, parity pricing and low-price 
supplier. 
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· Product line pricing situation: Complementary product pricing, price bundling, 
customer value pricing 
· Cost-based pricing situation: Cost-plus pricing 
Different researchers also handle most of the above strategies but under different 
names. For example, Clarke and Dolan (1984) name parity pricing as a match strategy. 
Again, experience curve, the penetration, and skimming are handled for new products, 
but in Clarke and Dolan the experience (learning) curve is already included as a part of 
skimming or penetration strategy. Also Rao (1984) mentions the penetration and 
skimming strategy as the major strategies for new products.  
The simulation performed by Clarke and Dolan (1984) investigates price paths 
under different strategies.  In their study, there is an innovating firm that is first in a 
monopoly and then in a duopoly environment (by the entry of the second firm). In the 
paper, they basically investigate myopic, skimming, and penetration strategies for price. 
They try to determine the price paths for different leader and follower strategies.  
Sterman (2000) deals with the factors influence price and defines some parameters 
that can be used for various strategies.  In the study, the effect of costs and the inventory 
coverage are handled by some sensitivity parameters. It is possible to reflect learning 
curve effect to the price as mentioned in Milling (1996), Clarke and Dolan (1984), Rao 
(1984), as well as Noble and Gruce (1999). Since Sterman (2000) handles this 
relationship with the system dynamics approach, this map seems appropriate for 
building a framework. This framework can also be enhanced for other possible 
scenarios. The effect of costs on prices is defined as follows in Sterman (2000):  
         (3.31) 
where: 
ECP: Effect of costs on price 
SPC: Sensitivity of price to costs (0 < SPC < 1) 
MP: Minimum price  
EP: Expected price 
[ ]ECP=1+SPC* EC/EP-1
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3.2.3.  The Price Module 
Price is dynamic in the model as presented here. The price mechanism consists of 
two parts: the first forms the demand; and the second determines the price policy. 
In the first part, industry demand is formulated as a function of dynamic price. 
Sterman’s (2000) model is used as a framework with some differentiations. The main 
differentiation is the definition of reference demand. Since potential customers in the 
model are defined dynamically, a static reference demand may lead to logical problems 
in the simulation of the model. The model forces the indicated industry demand to be 
under a maximum consumption, which is here, defined as potential customers. Here, as 
potential customers decrease by time (since the simulation reaches a balance after initial 
purchases), the reference demand should adjust itself according to the remaining 
customers in order to reflect the effect of increasing and decreasing prices. 
Consequently, reference demand is defined as a percentage of potential customers in 
order to prevent the previously stated logical problems. (Equation (3.32)) 
 The original model also includes a demand adjustment time which smoothes 
demand. This adjustment is necessary because there is an information flow. However, 
this delay may lead to orders more than the potential customers. To prevent such a risk, 
a MIN function is defined additional to the smooth function (Equation (3.33)).  Another 
addition to the price module is the inclusion of FET converter. This converter holds the 
entry time of the firm. The firm’s industry demand should be zero unless the firm enters 
the market. This condition is satisfied with Equation (3.34). 
  RID.K = RID_Perc.K * PC.K (3.32) 
  FID_1.K = MIN (PC.K, SMOOTH (FIID_1.K, 0.2)) (3.33) 
FIID_1.K = IF TIME ³ FET_1.K THEN MIN (PC.K, RID.K * MAX(0, 1 +     
DCS.K*((FP_1.K-RP.K)/RID.K))) ELSE 0               (3.34) 
where: 
RID_Perc.K: Reference industry demand percentage (dimensionless)  
FET_1.K: The time at which firm’s initial product is launched (year) 
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FP_1.K: Firm’s price at any time (dollars/product) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-7 Industry demand as a function of price 
Since we focus on a case of two firms (duopoly) in the market, the same 
mechanism is also modeled for the competitor. The unique converters for both of the 
firms (related to market properties) are defined once and ghost converters are used for 
the competitor (Figure 3-7). As in the diffusion module, more attention should be paid 
in the replication in the case of identical products. Ghost and unique converters should 
be determined carefully. For unique products, ghost nodes should be used for PC, but in 
the case of different products, solely related potential customers’ stock should be used. 
Since the market segment of each different product will also differ, a ghost node would 
be inappropriate.  
 The second part of the price module deals with the price setting process. The 
interaction between cost and price is based on Sterman’s (2000) model. Price is defined 
as a stock, which allows biflow which is illustrated in Figure 3-8. The final and 
probably the most critical differentiation includes the competitor’s price effect.   
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Figure 3-8 Firm’s price setting process 
The effect of competitor’s price is reflected on the map similar to the effect of 
costs. Such a competition between prices is also formulated in Kim (1988) in addition to 
Sterman’s (2000) formulation. In our formulation, the competitor’s entry time is also 
considered (Equation (3.35)). In our price module, a decrease in the cost may lead to a 
reduction in the price (based on the determination of the sensitivity coefficient ), and 
similarly a reduction in the competitor’s price may force the firm to decrease price until 
a lower bound, which is set to 1.05% of the cost. The related formulation is represented 
in Equations (3.36) and (3.38).    
EcomP_1.K = IF TIME ³ CET_1.K THEN 
      1+FSPCP_1*(CP_1.K/FP_1.K-1) ELSE 1  (3.35) 
  FECP_1.K = 1 + FSPC_1*(FC_1.K/FP_1.K-1) (3.36) 
  FP_1.K = FP_1.J + (FPFlow_1.JK) * DT (3.37) 
FPFlow_1.JK = IF TIME < FET_1.K THEN 0 
ELSE IF (FP_1.K * FEComP_1.K *FECP_1.K) > (1.05)*FC_1.K 
 THEN (FP_1.K * FEComP_1.K * FECP_1.K-FP_1.K) /(PAT) 
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     ELSE ((1.05*FC_1.K)-FP_1.K)/(PAT)   (3.38) 
where: 
EcomP_1.K: Effect of competitor’s price on price (dimensionless) 
FECP_1.K:  Effect of cost on price (dimensionless) 
FSPCP_1: Sensitivity of price to competitor’s price (0 < SPCP < 1) (dimensionless)  
FSPC: Firm’s sensitivity of price to cost (0 < SPC < 1) (dimensionless)  
FC_1.K: Firm’s cost (dollars/product) 
CET_1.K: The time at which competitor’s initial product is launched (Year) 
CP_1.K: Competitor’s price (dollars/product) 
PAT: Price adjustment time (years).   
In the model price function becomes; 
P=f(CompP,FC)  
Since the price is modeled as a stock, the change in the price is controlled by 
biflow which both allows decrease and increase. This flow not only controls the lower 
bound of price with IF_THEN formulation but also guarantees the presence of the firm 
with its entrance time (FET). Note that presence of the competitor is also controlled 
with the converter CET in Equation (3.38). 
This model is also replicated for the competitor’s activities. If two firms’ products 
are not identical, a competition based on prices will not occur. Therefore, the module 
presented above reduces to Figure 3-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-9 Firm’s price setting process without competitor 
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The pricing module is also quite flexible in terms of applying different strategies. 
The module not only allows us to include other formulas that are dependent on the entry 
time of the follower but also allows us to define strategies based on parameters. For 
example, an aggressive strategy can be applied by setting sensitivity parameters equal to 
0. It is possible to combine price skimming, learning curve effect, leader pricing, 
customer value pricing and cost-based pricing from the strategies grouped by Noble and 
Gruca (1999). 
3.3. Advertising  
Advertising is one of the most important marketing activity that affects the sales 
growth of products. Advertising is included in the modeling of the decision process by 
various researchers. Generally, the innovative demand for a product is defined by the 
effect of advertising on demand as stated in the diffusion module. In line with the 
literature, in our model, the factor that forms innovative demand is advertising.  
Horsky & Simon (1983) introduce the effect of advertising to the purchase 
probability by a function of advertising expenditures and an effectiveness coefficient. 
As can be seen from Equation (3.39), advertising and resources such as reports in the 
media (represented by a) are the factors, which influence innovative purchase.  
  P(t) = a + b*Ln A(t) + g* Q(t) (3.39) 
where: 
P(t) = Probability of purchase at time t. 
A(t) = Level of producer’s advertising expenditure at time t.  
Q(t) = Number of people who have already adopted by time t.  
a = Information conveyed to innovators through alternative channels (media reports) 
 b  = Effectiveness of imitative contact 
As Horsky and Simon (1983) state the above equation includes diminishing 
returns. Any innovator becomes a part of imitative purchase (this person may persuade 
other potential customers to buy the product) and during the time horizon, the total 
  50 
number of potential customers decreases also by the effect of these earlier adopters. 
This is named as the first diminishing effect. Log transformation, which prevents higher 
spending on advertising, is the second part of diminishing effects.  This formula 
assumes that advertising expenses are only effective immediately after the release. 
Thus, Horsky and Simon (1983) omit time lag. However, the effect of a period’s 
expenses should be carried to subsequent periods by proper effectiveness weights.  
Kalish and Lilien (1986) also introduce the advertising effect for innovative 
demand. They also emphasize the definition of advertising level. Either advertising 
expenses or advertising exposures are employed for the definition of the level. 
Simon and Sebastian (1987) handle the effect of advertising differently. In their 
study, the inclusion of advertising not only seems possible for an innovative purchase 
but also for an imitative purchase or even both. Since our model only accepts the effect 
for an innovative purchase, the details are not covered.  However, there are some 
important remarks for the use of advertising and reflecting diminishing and lagged 
effects that guide our model. In their model, advertising effects are represented by a 
logarithmic function, which guarantees a diminishing effect of advertising on demand. 
Also due to affected people and decreased potential customers, the second part of 
diminishing return is provided. Additionally, they suggest various models for 
representing the lagged effects of advertising. Three models are represented for different 
purposes. First one is a simple single period advertising model, second one is a more 
complicated multi period advertising model that assigns different effectiveness 
coefficients (Equation (3.40)), and the last one is a highly complicated multi-period 
model, which includes many exogenous parameters for the weights, which are hard to 
estimate. 
        
t
t t t-t
t=0
f (A)= ? lnAå      (3.40) 
where:  
ft(A) =  Cumulative advertising efforts that affect sales in period t  
?t  = Effectiveness of advertising in pre-period t. (t can take on various values for 
periods 0,1,…,t)  
  51 
At-t  = Advertising efforts released in period t-t. (Summation gives the accumulated 
efforts till period t) 
3.3.1. Advertising Module 
 The advertising module consists of two parts. The first part displays total 
advertising expenditures whereas the second part builds the whole advertising activity 
along with lagged effects and proper coefficients. Figure 1.7. represents the first part of 
the advertising module. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-10 Firm’s advertising module (Part 1) 
Advertising expenses depend on the income from the product and launch 
expenses (Equation (3.41)). Initial sales efforts are provided by launch advertising 
expenses and the duration for these expenses. After the determination of the total 
expenses, the logarithm of the expenses is taken for the diminishing effect of 
advertising. Converter FAdvExpF 1 represents this transformation.   
FAExp_1.K = IF TIME ³  FET_1.K AND TIME < FET_1.K + FLAD_1 THEN 
(FLAExp_1 + FABR 1*(FP_1.K)*FS 1.JK) 
ELSE IF TIME ³ FET_1.K + FLAD_1 THEN 
(FABR_1*(FP_1.K)*FS_1.JK) 
ELSE 0 (3.41) 
FAdvExpF_1.K = IF FAExp_1.K >0 THEN LN(FAExp_1.K) ELSE 0  (3.42) 
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where: 
FAExp_1.K: Firm’s total advertising expenditures per year (dollars/year) 
FABR_1: Firm’s advertising budget ratio (dimensionless) 
FLAD_1: Firm’s launch advertising duration (years) 
FLAExp_1: Firm’s launch advertising expenses per year (dollars/year) 
FAdvExpF_1.K: Firm’s total advertising expenses’ function (dimensionless)  
 
As mentioned earlier, the second part of the advertising module converts these 
advertising efforts (expenses) to the advertising effect that influences innovative 
demand. Based on the articles, expenses are used for advertising measure, logarithm 
transformation is performed, and a multi-period advertising model is employed. 
Equation (3.43) represents our advertising activity in general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-11 Firm’s advertising module (Part 2) 
In Figure 3-11, each period’s advertising expenditure is carried through the 
subsequent periods by sequentially drawn stocks. While carrying one period’s effect to 
the next, the coefficients E1, E2 and E3 are used. Also note that the  initial effect of an 
advertising effort is higher than the subsequent periods (E1 > E2 > E3). 
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                      FAE_1.K = FAE_i * (FAEfP1_1.K+FAEfP2_1.K+FAEfP3_1.K)  (3.43) 
FAEfP1_1.K = FAEP1_1.JK * E1 * FID_1.K (3.44)  
  FAEP1_1.K = FAEP1_1.J + (FAEFlow1_1.JK - FAEFlow2_1.JK)*DT (3.45) 
  FAEFlow1_1.JK = FAdvExpF_1.K/DT (3.46) 
  FAEFlow2_1.JK = FAEP1_1.K/DT (3.47) 
  
where: 
FAE_1.K: Firm’s total advertising effect in one year (customers/year) 
FAE_i: Firm’s advertising effectiveness (dimensionless) 
FAEfP(i)_1.K : Firm’s advertising effect due to the expenses released in the (t-i+1)th 
period (customers) i= 1,2,3 
FAEP(i)_1.K: Firm’s advertising expenditures function related to the (t-i+1)th  period. 
i=1,2,3 (dimensionless) 
FAEFlowi_1.JK: Flow of firm’s advertising expenses function from the (t-1+i)th period 
to the (t+i)th period. i=1,2,3 (dimensionless) 
Ei : The effectiveness of advertising after i periods. i=1,2,3 (dimensionless) 
 
As in the other modules, the advertising module is replicated for the competitor. 
However, Ei’s (i=1,2,3) are uniquely formulated since this parameter is specific to the 
market and product. In this module, the product’s design quality does not make sense. 
In any case (identical products or not), each firm’s any product should have separate 
advertising activity module. 
3.4. Word of Mouth  
The word of mouth creates an imitative demand for a product. A simple and 
unique formulation is used for this demand. The imitation coefficient and accumulated 
adopters until that time are sufficient to calculate the effect. This imitation coefficient 
also includes the probability of meeting an adopter and a non-adopter.  
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3.4.1. The Word of Mouth Module 
The word of mouth module has a quite simple formulation and clear connections. 
Although this relationship is common in the literature, Sterman’s (2000) system 
dynamics representation is taken as a reference with the necessary adjustments. The 
related equation and figure are as follows:  
FWOME_1.K = IF TIME ³ FET_1.K THEN 
                   C*WOMi*FID_1.K *FIB_1.K /PC_Total.K ELSE 0                    (3.48) 
where: 
c: Contact rate (an adopter can meet c non-adopters) (1/year) 
WOMi: WOM fraction (an adopter can persuade a non-adopter with probability i) 
(dimensionless) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-12 Firm’s word of mouth module 
This module is also replicated for the competitor. It should be noted that neither 
the firm nor the competitor has a negative word of mouth effect. In the model, all word 
of mouth effects are assumed to be positive.   
  55 
3.5. Learning Curve and Economies of Scale Effect   
The price of new products decreases ove r time due to the experience (learning) 
effect and scale economies. Costs are assumed to fall as accumulated sales and sales 
within a period increase.  
There is a common sense in the formulation of the learning curve effect, which 
depends on the initial experience, the initial cost and the strength of the learning curve. 
In general, the total unit cost declines by 20% - 30%, whenever the accumulated volume 
doubles (Sterman, 2000 and Robinson and Lakhani 1975). A parameter, which 
represents the strength of the learning curve, is determined based on this reduction 
percentage. If costs fall by 20% whenever the accumulated volume doubles, then this 
parameter becomes approximately 0.3. Furthermore, if costs fall by 30%, then this 
parameter becomes 0.5. Sterman (2000) derives this simple formulation. (Equation 
(3.49)) 
            a=-ln(1-r)/ln2                  (3.49) 
where: 
a = Strength of the learning curve (0.3 = a = 0.5) 
r = Cost reduction fraction (0.2 = r = 0.3 – A common sense)  
For the effect of learning curve, the  following equation is used by Sterman (2000), 
Robinson and Lakhani (1975) and Sterman et al. (1995).  
 ( )a0 0C=C * Q /Q    (3.50) 
where: 
C = Cost  
C0 = Initial cost 
Q = Experience (Accumulated production volume) 
Q0 = Initial experience 
In some research, cost is divided into two parts. The first part of the cost does not 
depend on the learning curve, whereas the second part does. Consequently, a 20% 
decrease only affects the second part (Sterman et al., 1995).  
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3.5.1. The Cost Module 
In the model, the learning curve and economies of scale are included as factors 
that may lead to cost reductions. The learning curve effect is formulated based on 
accumulated production volume. As mentioned in the previous section, there is a 
common sense for representing the learning curve effect.   
The Economies of scale effect is represented in the model by a reduction 
coefficient effect determined over total sales within a term. This reduction coefficient 
effect is illustrated in Figure 3-13. 
 
Figure 3-13 Economies of scale effect 
Lastly, in the module, these two effects are combined and a final cost is 
determined. Also as illustrated earlier, only a part of the cost is subjected to the learning 
curve effect. This ratio is set as 35%. Equation (3.51) illustrates the enhanced cost 
formula. 
FC_1.K= IF TIME ³  FET_1 THEN ((0.65*FC0_1.K)+(0.35*FC0_1.K)*           
((Fexp0_1.K/(Fexp0_1.K+FTS_1.K))a))*FEOS ELSE FC0_1.K                   (3.51) 
where: 
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FC0_.K: Firm’s initial cost (dollars) 
FExp0: Firm’s initial experience (products1)  
FTS_1.K: Firm’s total sales (Accumulated production volume) (customers) 
FEOS: Firm’s economies of scale effect (dimensionless) (Figure 3-13)  
 
 This module illustrated in Figure 3-14 is also replicated for the competitor and for 
the second products fo r both firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-14 Firm’s cost module 
For the second products introduced by the firms, the initial experience is not a 
constant. This variable depends on the initial experience and the total production of the 
first product until the introduction of the second one. The related figure is depicted in 
Figure 3-15. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-15 Initial experience for the second product 
 
 ExpInflow.JK = FS_1.KL (3.52) 
ExpOutflow.JK =  IF TIME >= FET_2 THEN FS_1.KL ELSE 0 
Exp_for_F2.K = Exp_for_F2.J + (ExpInflow.JK – ExpOutflow.JK)*DT 
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where: 
Exp_for_F2.K: Experience for the firm’s second product (products) 
ExpInflow.JK: Experience inflow (products/year) 
ExpOutflow.JK: Experience outflow (products/year). 
3.6. Delivery Delay Effect 
Waiting time for the products leads to negative effects on total demand. This 
delivery delay effect is incorporated into the system dynamics models by Little’s Law 
as stated in Sterman (2000). The ratio between the backlog and the sales of the product 
is a metric used for measuring the delivery delay. 
Forrester (1968) introduces the concepts of market and customer realizations to 
the delivery delay effect. In his study, the company recognizes delivery delay with a 
time lag and also the market recognizes this effect with a higher degree delay and time 
lag. Finally, this factor becomes an efficiency coefficient for the total demand and 
consequently for the total marketing activities. Forrester (1968) suggests a graph to 
demonstrate (Figure 3-16) the sales effectiveness based on delivery delay multiplier.  
3.6.1. The Delivery Delay Module 
The delivery delay module combines both Sterman’s (2000) and Forrester’s 
(1968) model. The sales effectiveness graph is taken from Forrester (1968) (Figure 
3-16). However, since the time unit is years, the x-scale is also represented in terms of 
years (1 year). (The flows and relationships mentioned in the previous section can be 
seen in Figure 3-17.)   
                                                                                                                                               
1 Customers  
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Figure 3-16 Graph for sales effectiveness (Adopted from Forrester (1968)) 
FDD_1.K = IF FS_1.KL > 0 THEN MAX(0,((B11.K/DT)/FS_1.KL)) – 1)  
  ELSE 0          (3.53) 
  FDDRF_1.K = FDDRF_1.J + (FDDFlow1_1.JK) * DT (3.54) 
  FDDRM_1.K = FDDRM_1.J + (FDDFlow2_1.JK) * DT (3.55) 
  FDDFlow1_1.KL = (FDD_1.K-FDDRF_1.K)/TRF (3.56) 
  FDDFlow2_1.KL = (FDDRF_1.K -F DDRM_1.K)/TRM (3.57) 
where: 
FDD_1.K: Firm’s delivery delay (years) 
FDDRF_1.K: Firm’s delivery delay effect recognized by the firm (years) 
FDDRM_1.K: Firm’s delivery delay effect recognized by the market (years) 
FDDFlow1_1.KL: Increase/decrease in the delivery delay (dimensionless) 
FDDFlow2_1.KL: Increase/decrease in the delivery delay (dimensionless) 
 Since there is an information flow for both the firm and the market, both will 
realize the real effect with a time lag, and this delay should be reflected with a 
SMOOTH function. Note that the structure illustrated in Figure 3-17 is another 
representation of the SMOOTH function. 
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Figure 3-17 Delivery delay module 
3.7. Initial Values of Stocks and Parameters  
In this section, the initial values of external parameters and stocks are considered.  
However, the initial values of some converters and stocks are a part of various policies. 
For example, initial value of firm’s price is a consequence of firm’s pricing strategy. In 
this section, the initial values for the base case that are used for model validity and the 
sensitivity analysis are provided.  
3.7.1. Initial Values of Stocks and Parameters in the Diffusion Module 
INIT PC = PC_Total (Base Case Value – B CV) 
This value differs according to the scenario and related market segment. For 
example, if Product 2 is launched, then a percentage depends on the presence of the 
products in the market will be allocated for PC_Total. For example if Product 3 is 
already in the market but if Product 1 is not in the market then this percentage becomes 
80%. However, for the base case 100% of the total potential customers are assigned in 
order to prevent confusion.   
INIT PC_Total = 2 750 000 
It is possible to take the total number of households in Turkey and the penetration 
ratio of such products from State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Rebuplica of 
Turkey (SIS). However, in such a situation, the Installed Base stock should not be 
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empty at the beginning of the simulation. This is not the case to be investigated in this 
study; here, the aim is to investigate various policies based on the initial growth of 
durable household goods. Therefore, assigning a total number of potential customers 
would not violate the real situation. The underlying assumption is “even some of these 
people were in the installed base at time 0, till the time they purchase the product (this 
may take years) they would already again come to the potential customers”. However, 
there is another important issue that should be considered. There are 4 main household 
goods producer in Turkey (SIS, 2001). But in this study there will be at most two 
producers. Also note that SIS does not include importations. In order to be consistent, 
the total number of households is divided by four and then assigned as the initial value.  
Keeping the total number of potential customers at a lower level provides the 
opportunity of observing the effects of different scenarios more precisely. The total 
number of households in 1990 was recorded as 11 188 636 (SIS, 2001), consequently, 
the initial value is decided as 2 750 000. Note that according to the customer segments, 
the initial value related to the segments differs as explained in Section 3.8.4. 
NIR = 0.028 
Net increase rate for the total number of households is estimated based on the total 
number of households in years 1985 (9 730 018 households) and 1990 (11 188 636 
households). An approximate increase rate is derived from the following equation: 
  (1+p) 5 * 9730018 = 11188636 Þ p » 0.028 (3.58) 
AL = 10 
The average lifetime of a product is assigned as 10 years. 
INIT FB_1 = 0 
INIT FIB_1 = 0 
At the beginning of the simulation, these stocks are empty. After sales, customers 
will begin to accumulate. 
FTC = 250 000 
The firm’s total capacity is determined based on SIS data and the sales amount of 
one of the biggest household goods producer in Turkey. First, the amount provided by 
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SIS is compared with the sales provided by the factory. Since these numbers are 
approximately at the same levels, the sales amount provided by the factory is used. The 
total number of production in a year is taken, and the total number of exports is 
subtracted. Finally 250 000 products/year is assigned as total capacity. 
FCA_1 = 1.0 (BCV) 
Since in the base case there is only one product, the capacity allocation ratio is set 
to 1.0.  
3.7.2. Initial Values of Stocks and Parameters in the Price Module 
RIDE = 1.6  
This elasticity is assumed as a constant for all scenarios. The value is determined 
by the range stated in Lipsey and Courant (1996). In their study, the approximate values 
of price-demand elasticity for some products are stated. Furniture and automobiles are 
the two products closer more resembling the types of durable household goods. 
Therefore, 1.6 is assumed for durable household goods based on this information.  
RID_Perc = 0.8 
This percentage is the ratio of the potential customers at the reference price. This 
is a part of the assumption of gathering reference price information from customers. It is 
assumed that within a product segment, 80% of the customers have a purchase 
intention. However, as also stated in 3.8.5, this ratio changes if there is not a product in 
the upper segments. The related calculation can be seen from Equations (3.65) and 
(3.66). 
RP = 525 (BCV) 
Reference price takes different values for different segments. It is assumed that 
this value is gathered from customers after surveys and from historical data analysis. 
The methodologies for gathering such information and difficulties are stated in 3.8.2. 
Also note that there is a trade-off between time and cost of getting such a data and 
preparing such a survey against this assumption. There is no doubt that the cost would 
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be higher, therefore, this assumption seems reasonable. For the base case, one segment 
(segment 2) is used, therefore, the reference price is set to 525 $.   
PAT = 0.2 
The price adjustment time is set to 0.2 years. This value seems reasonable in the 
durable household goods industry for adjustments and information flow. Also note that 
0.2 years is used for other information delays. 
INIT FP_1 = 700 (BCV) 
FSPCP_1 = 0.5 (BCV) 
FSPC_1 = 0.5 (BCV) 
3.7.3. Initial Values of Stocks and Parameters in the Advertising Module 
INIT FAEP1_1 = 0 
INIT FAEP2_1 = 0 
INIT FAEP3_1 = 0 
The initial values of these three stocks are set to zero. They are used for the 
determination of each period’s advertising expense effect, therefore, the stock should be 
empty for a new flow.  
E1 = 1 
E2 = 0.70 
E3 = 0.20 
These parameters are the coefficients for the advertising effects carried through 
the subsequent periods. The decrease from first period to second period is 30%, whereas 
that of the second to the third is approximately 71%. In other words, by the time the 
probability of to remember advertising is decreases.  
FABR_1 = 0.06 
This budget ratio seems reasonable. Note that, Forrester (1961) uses this value as 
well. 
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FAE_i = 0.0015 
This coefficient and WOM effectiveness coefficient are the parameters that 
control diffusion speed. To estimate these parameters are possible as Bass (1969) does. 
However, since a historical sales data for a durable household good is not available, the 
parameters estimated by Bass (1969) are used. In his study, this estimation is done for 
eleven-product category. First of all, three out of these eleven products are selected, 
because they are the ones from the durable household goods category. Based on the 
parameter values, a lower and an upper bound are determined. Note that the consistency 
of these two parameters is also essential.  
The values estimated for innovation coefficient are 0.0026, 0.018, 0.027. 
However, in this study a single coefficient is not used, rather, this effect is carried 
through periods along with an expenditures effect. Because of this modification, these 
values are divided by 26 (13*2), 13 standing for the logarithm of an approximate 
expenditure and 2 stands for the carrying effect through periods. The range is 
determined as 0.0001 – 0.001. While determining a value for FAE_i, which value 
should be assigned for WOMi? For this parameter, the mean of the three values 
provided by Bass (1961) is assigned initially.  
The values for c*WOMi is 0.17, 0.22, 0.25. The average is 0.21. Since c is set to 
10, the value for WOMi becomes 0.021. After this value, the model is reduced and 
FAE_i and WOMi are determined simultaneously under different values. Also note that 
in Bass (1969), the ratio of imitation coefficient to innovation coefficient is given for 
these products. After determining the beginning values, the effects of other factors are 
reduced as much as possible. For example, an unlimited capacity is assigned to the firm, 
the sensitivity of the cost effect on price is set to zero and the potential customers 
percentage is set 1. With these assignments, we totally close the model to external 
effects. The repeat purchase is also omitted because this effect is not included in Bass 
(1969). Under these conditions, the model is run for the different values of FAE_i and 
WOMi (Table 3-1). After each simulation the coefficients are again considered and the 
next simulation’s coefficients are determined. For example, after the first run, it is seen 
that the desired growth rate is not reached and FAE_i is iterated and run again. After the 
second run WOMi adjusted and this procedure repeated until the desired growth is 
reached. Recall that since in this study the aim is to investigate the interactions of two 
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firms with the same growth coefficients and time horizon is set as 12 years, such 
adjustments would not lead to any inaccurate decisions. The ratio for the 8th run is 14 
(0.55/(0.0015*26), which does not violate the ratio provided in Bass (1969).   
Table 3-1 Simulation design for FAE_i and WOMi (without repeat purchase) 
RUN # FAE_i   WOMi 
1 0.00055 0.021 
2 0.001 0.021 
3 0.001 0.025 
4 0.001 0.03 
5 0.001 0.04 
6 0.0015 0.04 
7 0.0015 0.05 
8 0.0015 0.055 
 
 
 The graph of 8th run is illustrated in Figure 3-18. However, when repeat 
purchase is included the peak point shifts to right. A new simulation design is prepared, 
and these coefficients are again tested under repeat purchase (Table 3-2). The desired 
growth is reached by the coefficients of Run # 11 (The ratio is 18). The graph is can be 
seen from Figure 3-19. Also note that the graphs for other simulations are represented in 
the Appendix A.  
Table 3-2 Simulation design for FAE_i and WOMi (with repeat purchase) 
RUN # FAE_I WOMi 
9 0.0015 0.055 
10 0.0015 0.06 
11 0.0015 0.07 
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Figure 3-18 Innovative and imitative demand for run # 8 (without repeat purchase) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-19 Innovative and imitative demand for run # 11 (with repeat purchase) 
 
FLAD_1 = 3 (BCV) 
FLAExp_1 = 1 000 000  (BCV) 
3.7.4. Initial Values of Stocks and Parameters in the WOM Module 
c = 10 
c is assigned as 10. This means, one adopter meets 10 non-adopters in a year.   
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WOM_i = 0.07 
As stated in the previous section, Bass’ (1969) parameter estimation is used for 
assigning a value. This parameter is determined toge ther with the FAE_i. The related 
graphs and simulation designs are provided in Section 3.7.3.  
3.7.5. Initial Values of Stocks and Parameters in the Cost Module 
INIT FTS_1 = 0 
FC0_1 = 525 (BCV) 
Initial cost takes different values for different segments since reference prices 
differ. The value is determined based on the minimum price level in Section (3.8.4). For 
the base case segment 2 is used; therefore, the related initial base cost is set to 525.   
Fexp0_1 = 500 000 
This parameter stands for the firm’s initial experience. The total of two years’ 
capacity is assigned for this parameter (250 000 * 2). Note that the sensitivity analysis 
of this parameter is also performed.  
Alfa (a ) = 0.3 
This parameter displays the strength of the learning curve. For a decrease by 20% 
in the cost (related cost part), Alfa should be taken 0.3. This is the value used for the 
base case and all scenarios, but note that this is also tested in the sensitivity analysis 
section.  
EOS Effect 
As also stated in 3.5.1, this effect is illustrated by a table function (Figure 3-13)   
3.7.6. Initial Values of Stocks and Parameters in the Delivery Delay Module 
INIT FDDRF_1 = FDD_1 
INIT FDDRM_1 = FDDRF_1 
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The initial values of these stocks are a part of the information flow in the delivery 
delay module. Therefore, they are dependent on the previous information stock or 
converter.  
TRF = 0.2 
TRM = 0.2 
The time for market and company to recognize the delivery delay is set as 0.2 
years. Also mentioned in PAT (initial value section), this delay is reasonable in durable 
household goods industry for information flows.  
FDDE Coefficient 
The details and related table function values are provided in Section 3.6.1 and in 
Figure 3-16. 
3.8. Market Structure and Customer Behavior 
Before introducing the market structure and customer behavior, some examples 
from the literature are summarized. Later, price perception and level, in other words, the 
main common point with the models is discussed based on marketing literature and 
related definitions. With this explanation, the properties of market structure and 
underlying assumptions are introduced in the subsequent section.  
3.8.1. Examples From the Literature  
The study performed by Moorthy (1988) is composed of two identical firms, 
which competing on a single product attribute and price. Basically, this attribute is 
defined as quality because in the model, customers always prefer more of this attribute. 
Also, customers differ in their willingness to purchase the product. In the study, 
product’s perceptional position and physical position is not distinguished. Also, it is 
assumed that higher quality products cost more to produce than do lower quality ones. 
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In the model, there are two firms indexed 1 and 2, which can produce a product 
within interval [0,¥). This one-dimensional scale represents the product’s attribute upon 
which the firms are compete.  
In the customer part of the model, a consumer of type-t is willing to pay ts for a 
unit of product s. These consumer types classify customers and build customer 
segments.   
Customers can observe all available products before their decision to buy. They 
prefer the ones that provide higher surplus. Note that the surplus is the difference 
between what they are willing to pay and what they are asked to pay.  
Vandenbosch & Weinberg (1995) extend the study performed by Moorthy (1988). 
They introduce another attribute and perform the study on a two dimensional scale. The 
absolute difference between the products is measured by multiplication of the absolute 
differences of both in two dimensions. If absolute difference is zero, then each firm can 
obtain 50% of the market.  
Dobson and Kalish (1988) summarize the most common properties of the 
theoretically oriented articles: customer willingness to pay (measured in dollar-metrics 
scale) is defined and decision to buy is based on maximized welfare, which is 
determined as the difference between reservation price and actual price. The typical 
simplifying assumption is the only attribute “quality”. This attribute brings ease of 
selection because always more of it is preferable. Also fixed costs are omitted.  
In the model, each customer provides a reservation price and selects the product 
based on the difference between this reservation price and the product’s actual price. 
Data about the market is collected via a survey (Conjoint analysis).  Both variable and 
fixed costs are included. However, in the model, competition and repeat purchase are 
omitted.   
The market structure build in Rao’s (1991) study differentiates from the basic 
assumptions in theoretically oriented approaches observed by Dobson and Kalish. Rao 
(1991) divides the market into two segments; each of behaves with different 
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expectations. The first segment’s behavior solely depends on price comparison, whereas 
the second segment compares both prices and brands.  
Ruebeck (2002) also defines the market structure in a manner similar to Moorthy 
(1988), Dobson and Kalish (1988), Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995). Consumers 
purchase the product (computer hard disk drive) based on the utility function, which is 
defined as the difference between the willingness to pay for the specific quality levels 
and price of the product.  
In the study performed by Ofek & Srinivasan (2002), a measure of market value 
that compares the incremental unit cost of the improvement and the probability of 
customers’ purchase the firm’s product. Customers’ preferences are gathered by a 
conjoint analysis and the profitability of the improvements on the products are 
conducted based on the developed metric. This metric mainly depends on the 
customers’ utility from an additional attribute. Again, similar to other studies, this utility 
function also constitutes price and customers’ welfare.   
Kopalle, Rao & Assunçâo (1996) handle the issue of reference price. In their 
study, a dynamic reference price concept is introduced. They formulate reference prices 
as a function of previous period’s price and reference price. This approach is also 
supported by (Nagle, 1987) and by many researchers. 
The utility function proposed by Armony & Haviv (2003) differs from earlier 
models. In their study, customer’s choice depends on the service price and the expected 
waiting costs. Therefore, according to the provided service or product specifications, 
customers’ surplus may include various parameters.  
3.8.2. Price Perception and Price Levels  
Price perception is the most common issue in the examples. Almost in every 
study, terms such as reservation price, reference price, maximum welfare or surplus that 
are based on actual and reference levels. These all terms are a consequence of “price 
sensitivity”. Mainly purchase decision is an output of these levels. We also use similar 
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levels in the model. But what are those levels? What is the logic behind these levels? Is 
it possible to estimate these levels? Many more questions can be derived. Before 
introducing the details of the model, the answers to these questions are discussed. 
First of all, we should discuss whether it is possible to measure the value of a 
product with its price, because the value of the product is the main point behind the 
price sensitivity. The concept of product analysis pricing that was developed in the 
Glacier Metal Company, Ruislip, Middlesex, England, identifies this issue. This concept 
aims to measure the value and consequently the price associated with the products. 
Gabor (1988) summarizes Product Analysis Pricing (PAP) as follows: “The 
central idea of Product Analysis Pricing (PAP) is that the price which the buyer is 
prepared to pay is directly determined by those aspects of the product that have 
significance for him. It claims that these aspects can be quantified and a value schedule 
attached to each, based on the buyer’s judgment rather than on the cost of the product. 
The appropriateness of the quotations derived from these values, and the extent to 
which the prices approximate the optimum level can be judged by the percentage of the 
market captured.” (Gabor, 1988) 
Customers’ behavior and purchase intention is independent from the costs. The 
market structure and related price levels for different market segments are assigned 
based on the design quality provided by the company.  
This cost-independent level can be thought as a reference price, which identifies 
the customers who are willing to pay at a specific price. However, firms do not always 
sell the product at this level. They apply various pricing strategies -as stated in pricing 
section- based on their long range planning, aims and competitors’ behavior. But, how 
low and how high can this price can? Does the company still sell at a very low price? 
What determines this low price? It is obvious that the next issue is the determination of 
these limits along with underlying reasons.  
In general there is an upper limit for the consumer to pay for a product. This limit 
is not only dependent on affordability but also on their rational observation based on the 
product attributes. There is a point when the homogenous customer says ‘This product 
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is not worth this price and also I cannot afford it at this level’. This level is commonly 
used in various researches. Dobson and Kalish’s study can be shown as an example. As 
many researchers they refer this level as a ‘reservation price’.  
There is a common sense of ‘price is an indicator of quality’. To select the 
expensive product instead of a cheaper one results from two beliefs: (1) to impress 
others, (2) to avoid the risk associated with the cheaper one. (Gabor, 1988) The risk 
associated with cheaper one is the belief that cheaper item cannot provide the 
satisfaction that is promised with the design quality. Therefore, the concept of minimum 
price, that makes people believe that the design quality can satisfy their expectations, 
arises. Any price lower than this minimum price level leads to no sales based on the 
perception. Similar to the level (reference price), this perception of minimum price is 
independent from costs. Because the issue of cost is not the customers’ problem, they 
never care about cost or companies’ profit. However, this lower bound for the price has 
a strong relationship with the substitutes’ prices and competitors’ pricing policies. In a 
monopoly, the customers’ beliefs for the minimum price will have a strong relationship 
to the customer’s pricing policy. If there are competitors in other segments, this lower 
bound will be automatically dependent on the other segments. It is obvious that price 
perception cannot be investigated by itself alone. The dynamics related to the product 
type, market structure, segments, expectations should all be considered together. Then 
this perception would be stricter. These dynamics are also valid for the maximum limit. 
Beside the complexity of this issue, in general for the limits it can be said that, the lower 
limit stands for quality beliefs and the upper limit stands for affordability and 
willingness level. Outside these limits price build a barrier that stops purchase. 
The determination of these limits is a complex issue as mentioned above.   
Surveys and past sales data are the techniques used for this purpose.  However, surveys 
are more preferable than purchase data. Nagle (1987) summarizes the reasons behind 
this preference as follows: 
· Survey data cost much less than purchase data to collect 
· It can be collected for large durable goods, such as automobiles 
· It can be collected even before a product is designed, when the 
information is most valuable in directing product development 
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· It can be collected quickly (Nagle, 1987) 
However, there is a problem which Nagle (1987), and other researchers state with 
survey data and the customers’ responses in survey data, which do not reflect their real 
purchase intention. Especially questions directly related to price are under a great risk. 
However, this is still the preferable method due to above reasons.  
Gabor (1988) summarizes the main questions that should be asked for 
determination of the limits. 
· If you wanted to buy a product with X, Y, Z attributes and saw what you 
were looking for, which is the highest price you would be prepared to pay? 
· Which is the lowest price at which you would still buy – I mean the price 
below which you would not trust the quality? (Gabor, 1988) 
If these questions are asked to a homogenous group, the researcher can determine 
the highest and lowest levels for the price. Of course, the answers would not be identical 
but close due to the homogeneity of the group’s affordability and willingness, or 
purchase intention.  
3.8.3. Market Structure of the Mode l 
The market consists of two identical firms as mentioned in the earlier sections. 
These firms compete on a single attribute, design quality, as similar to the earlier 
researches stated in Section 3.8.1. If two products have the same design quality, then the 
concept of pricing and advertising is introduced for competition.  
There are specific design quality levels for the products. Any two products having 
the same design quality are referred as “identical products”. The term identical not only 
refers to the functional properties but also refers to the physical properties such as 
material, color, and so on.  
The market consists of four customer segments and each design quality satisfies 
the expectations of customers only in the related segment. If and only if there is not a 
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product in the related segment, then the customer can purchase the product from a lower 
segment with product available (not from upper segment due to affordability). 
Another concept is affordability and willingness for purchase. The market 
segments consists of homogenous customers in terms of affordability and willingness 
for buying a product. In other words, these customers’ purchase intentions are similar.  
The firms are identical in terms of producing products from any design quality 
level. They both know the market and they can both have the opportunities for reaching 
the different segments. Also, they both can introduce two products.  
Another assumption is about the costs of products. As also assumed in Moorthy 
(1988), producing higher quality products cost more than producing lower quality 
products. A linear relationship is also assumed for quality and price. Then the market 
segment is related to the concept of price sensitivity. The segments and related 
sensitivities (limits) are stated in the next section.  
3.8.4. Market Segments and Price Perception 
There are four segments in the market. The highest segment (#4) consists of 
relatively wealthy customers who have purchase intention for the product with design 
quality level. The next segment is a more moderate segment but still have a purchase 
intention for a superior product. The second segment can be named as the base segment, 
which includes the highest share among the other segments. On the other hand, the 
lowest segment is related to the product design quality level one. The products in this 
group are assumed as having the basic function of the product.  
The percentages are assumed as:  
· 10% for segment 4 – related product is Product – 4  
· 20% for segment 3 – related product is Product – 3    
· 50% for segment 2 – related product is Product – 2  
· 20% for segment 1 – related product is Product – 1  
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As mentioned previously, the customers of segment 4 can purchase the 
Product-3, if the Product-4 has not been introduced to the market yet. If Product-3 has 
not already been introduced as the Product-4, then the customers of first two segments 
will automatically buy Product-2. This chain goes on in this manner. The rule is “the 
customer of a higher segment can purchase the produc t from lower segments unless the 
related product introduces to the market.” Of course, the inverse is not valid. Since a 
customer from segment 1 cannot afford a product from higher segments, he/she cannot 
purchase the product. Therefore, he/she will wait till the introduction of Product-1.  
The following graph is used in the model for calculating the potential customers’ 
percentage. Although, quality 5 should not be in the graph (there are four products and 
segments), due to property of discrete graph, it is automatically included and related PC 
percentage is again automatically set to 10%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-20 Quality versus PC percentage 
 
The price perception of the segments is determined by the reservation prices.  
These upper limits are assumed to determined by historical data and survey. The 
demand within a segment is modeled by a linear demand curve as stated in Section 3.2.3   
and in Equations (3.32), (3.33) and (3.34). Therefore, after setting a reservation price it 
is possible to determine the reference price level and minimum level for a segment. 
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Recall that the segments and the price perceptions is an available information for both 
of the firms. Also note that the elasticity is set to 1.6 (Section 3.7.2). 
The firms aim to position the product for a single segment. Since the firms 
have the price perception data (levels for the products), they introduce the product to the 
related segment with a Target Costing approach. With this approach they aim a cost that 
will reach the minimum price level in the long term. Also the firms are aiming to get 
5% profit in the worst case; this minimum price level should be equal to the 5% profit 
margin from the scope of the firms. Also note that with the Target Costing approach, the 
principle of cost- independent price levels are not violated. This principle is discussed in 
Section 3.8.2. 
At this moment, the effect of learning curve and economies of scale become 
an important issue. With these effects, an approximate lower bound for the cost can be 
determined. In Equation (3.59), first the effect of learning curve is calculated (20% 
decrease per doubling the accumulated production volume) and then this part is 
multiplied by the economies of scale effect. In this calculation, an approximate level for 
the doubling is determined based on the total capacity of 12 years (simulation horizon). 
This means a total of 3 million products. When the learning curve effect formulation is 
applied this number is equivalent to a decrease of 44% (Assuming an initial experience 
of 500 000 products).  
The level of EOS effect is set to the usage of maximum capacity usage (4.9 % 
decrease in the cost). Then this cost level is set to minimum price level with a profit 
margin of 5% (Equation (3.60)). The minimum price level is known due to reference 
price and linear demand curve (Equation (3.64)). Therefore, the initial cost determined 
is the as same as the RP. Note that more than a twice doubling is assumed as stated 
earlier and this assumption is the underlying reason of this result (RP=C0). Recall that, in 
fact, these levels are independent from each other. However, since a target costing 
approach is used, and a consistency for the simulation is essential, such a calculation is 
preferred for assigning initial costs. It is also possible to assign independent initial costs; 
however in that case the minimum price level should be controlled with the lower 
bound of customer’ price perception, not in terms of cost. This is especially essential if 
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the model is run with four segments. Because “active four segments” means “four 
separate price perceptions and levels”. 
  [0.65*C0 + 0.35*C0*0.56]*0.951 » 0.8045 C0 (3.59) 
  0.8045*C0*1.05 » 0.85 C0 (3.60) 
  0.843*RP = Pmin = 0.85 C0 (3.61) 
  C0 » RP (3.62) 
The next issue is the determination of lower and upper bounds for the price 
levels. The upper bound is the point that no customer desires to purchase the product. In 
other words, 0% of the customers desire to purchase the product. On the other hand, the 
lower bound is the point that all the customers desire to purchase the product.   Equation 
(3.63) represents the upper bound whereas Equation (3.64) represents the lower bound. 
Recall that reference industry demand percentage is set to 80% (Section 3.7.2).  
  (0.8*PC)*(1-RIDE[(FP-RP)/RP] = 0*PC (3.63) 
  (0.8*PC)*(1-RIDE[(FP-RP)/RP] = 1.0*PC (3.64) 
The reservation prices and the price levels, that are determined based on the 
references prices and equations represented above, are displayed in Table 3-3. Recall 
that the reference prices are assumed to be collected from homogeneous customers 
within a segment. 
Table 3-3 Price levels for the segments 
Segments 
Reference 
Price ($) 
Min. Price 
(Lower Bound) 
($) 
Max. Price 
(Upper Bound) 
($) 
Initial Cost - C0 
($) 
1 250 211 406 250 
2 525 443 853 525 
3 1200 1012 1950 1200 
4 2500 2109 4062 2500 
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In the model, the relationship between the reference price and quality is shown by 
the following graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-21 Quality versus reference price 
3.8.5. Market Segments Under Different Competition Scenarios 
Roughly, price level or, in other words, reference price is the value of the product. 
The existence of a competitor’s product in the other segments will affect the number of 
people who will have a purchase intention not the price level. Therefore, the reference 
demand percentage related to the reference price is set again when the number of 
competitors change.  
For example, if all the competitors are active in the market in all segments, then 
the reference demand percentage at the specified reference price is 80%. However, if 
segments 1 and 2 are empty (no products), then the percentage of segment 3, at the 
specified level for Product-3 will differ. The number of customers who are willing to 
adopt Product-3 becomes: 
80% of segment 2 + 100% of segment 1 + 100% of segment 2 (3.65) 
Therefore the percentage becomes: 
  79 
[0.80 (0.50) + 1.0 (0.20) + 1.0 (0.10)] / 0.80 = 0.875 (3.66) 
The 0.80 in the denominator stands for the ratio of segments (1,2 and 3) compared 
to the total potential customers. The result 0.875 is the PC percentage of reference price 
of Product-3 when segments 1 and 2 are empty. The result would not change based on 
the presence of Product-4.  
3.8.6. Modeling Different Segments with System Dynamics 
All possibilities for the market entry times and product qualities are included in 
the model, in order to build a market structure as stated in the previous section. 
According to the scenario (quality levels and entry times), the related paths will become 
active and the rest redundant.  
The basic functions and dynamics also work as the same stated in the earlier 
sections (i.e. advertising, diffusion and etc.). The main difference is the dynamic 
number of sub-potential customers related to the presence of products with the related 
design quality. These dynamic potential customers are controlled via the inflows and 
outflows based on the entrance sequence and products’ design qualities. For example, if 
the firm launches product 3 and then the competitor launches product 4, then the firm 
will lose (0.3-0.2)/0.3 % of its market. Recall that the market size of segment 3 and 4 
are 20% and 30% respectively, and if product 4 is not launched to the market, its 
percentage becomes 30%. The reduction ratios, that are calculated based on the entrance 
time and product quality, are entered to the outflow of each stock in the diffusion 
framework. On the other hand, the inflow of the segment 4’s potential customers is 
10%. Therefore, while taking the specified percentage from one stock with an outflow, 
the same value is assigned to another stock by an inflow simultaneously, and these 
formulations carry the market structure and specifications to the model. 
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4. MODEL VALIDITY 
Model validity is an important phase of the model-based methodologies. In 
System Dynamics, this step has a vital importance. Barlas (1996) explains the 
underlying reason as follows: “Validity of the results in a model-based study are 
crucially dependent on the validity of the model”. 
There is not a unique procedure for model validity. The path to be followed 
depends on the aim of the study and availability of the information. In this study, the 
framework provided by Barlas (1996) is used. The tests are also included in other 
studies such as Forrester (1961) and Sterman (2000), however, the sequence and the 
classification make this reference preferable.  
In order to validate the model, direct structure tests and structure oriented 
behavior tests are performed. Behavior pattern tests are omitted because these tests are 
strongly related to the aim and content of the study. The underlying reason can be to 
explore a real system (application base study), to investigate an existing theory, to make 
an interactive simulation gaming or to learn the systems. These different objectives lead 
to different model validity procedures. Barlas (1996) states, “the models the models 
built for learning may not necessitate as much behavior accuracy testing as the 
traditional applications do.” Since the aim of this study is to understand the dynamics in 
a duopoly and compare the possible behaviors against different scenarios, the last group 
of tests is not applied.  
The following topics explore direct structure tests and structure-oriented behavior 
tests sequentially. 
  81 
4.1.  Direct Structure Tests 
These tests discuss the validity of the model equations directly without dynamic 
simulations. Structure confirmation tests (both empirical and theoretical), parameter 
confirmation test (both empirical and theoretical), direct extreme condition test and 
dimensional consistency test are conducted. 
Structure confirmation test means comparing real system information and model 
structure. The equations mostly depend on the literature and industry dynamics. The 
structure and the information conveyed through the structure are extensively discussed 
with the thesis advisor and two experts.  
Parameter confirmation test means the evaluation of constant parameters against 
the real life. This test also consists of two parts: a conceptual part and a numeric part. 
All parameters that are included in the model have real life meanings that are also used 
in other kind of models. Also note that an accurate estimation is possible if the extended 
data is available from the industry. To overcome this problem, for the parameters hard 
to estimate and determine, the estimations performed in the earlier studies are taken and 
adapted to the study (for word of mouth effectiveness and advertising effectiveness). 
Direct extreme condition does not involve simulation. In this test, each equation is 
taken by itself and the possible output of the equation is discussed under extreme 
conditions. This test is done regularly during the model building. After the development 
of each module and its integration to whole model, extreme cases are argued and, if 
necessary, corrections are made on the equations. 
As a last step, the dimensional consistency test is performed. In this test, right-
hand side and left-hand side of the equations are checked. The equations are manually 
checked. Note that, the equations are also checked by an expert. The model passed the 
test without including any meaningless parameters. However, during this test only one 
equation seems problematic. The effect of advertising expenses is reflected to the model 
with a logarithm function. This structure depends on the literature, known as the 
diminishing effect, and is used in this way in other models as well.  
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4.2. Structure Oriented Behavior Tests 
These tests check the validity of the model indirectly by applying certain behavior 
tests on model-generated behavior patterns. (Barlas, 1996). These tests involve 
simulation.  
In indirect extreme condition test, extreme values are assigned to the some 
selected parameters and model behavior investigated. In this test, extreme values are 
assigned to parameters; the firm’s advertising budget ratio (FABR), firm’s price and 
total capacity and reasonable patterns are obtained from the results. 
FABR is increased by a pulse function in the first test. In period 5, the advertising 
budget ratio is increased to 36% of the total sales. The model had not performed an 
impressive response against this aggressive pulse function. This behavior is expected 
due to the diminishing property of advertising also stated by various resources in the 
marketing literature. The related curves are illustrated in Figure 4-1.  
Figure 4-1 Direct extreme condition test for FABR 
In the second test, the sharp price increase and decrease are tested. First, the price 
is increased by $300 and by a pulse function and then in the second test the price is 
decreased by $300.  
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Figure 4-2 Direct extreme condition test for the firm’s price (Decrease) 
In  Figure 4-2, the impact of $300 decrease is apparent. However, the impact of 
the same amount of decrease ($300) is still apparent but not as much as observed in the 
first case (Figure 4-3). The underlying reason is the closeness of the minimum and 
maximum levels of the price. In the first test, the price is increased from $518 to $818 
and $818 is approximately equals to the maximum level (Maximum price – $853); 
however, in the second test the price falls to $217, almost the half of the minimum price 
level. Since the maximum size of market has already been reached by the lower bound 
of the price, much of this effect becomes redundant.  
The final direct extreme condition test is applied to initial capacity value, is 
adjusted by a step function and increased by 100 000 in period 6. The resulting graph is 
illustrated in Figure 4-4. The reason of the sudden peak after capacity expansion is the 
waiting customers in the backlog approximately since period 5. After this peak, the 
sales gradually rise and reach the new capacity level.  
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Figure 4-3 Direct extreme condition test for the firm’s price (Increase) 
 
Figure 4-4 Direct extreme condition test for the firm’s initial capacity 
 These tests display that the model behaves as expected under extreme conditions. 
The next group of tests is behavior sensitivity tests. 
Behavior sensitivity tests help to determine the parameters to which the model is 
highly dependent and sensitive. The sensitivity analysis for the following parameters is 
performed;  
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· word of mouth effectiveness coefficient 
· learning curve strength 
· initial experience 
For the advertising effectiveness coefficient, the range 0.0001 – 0.0025 is tested 
under the base case conditions. The simulation design is illustrated in Table 4-1. The 
comparative graphs are taken for word of mouth effect, advertising effect and total 
demand flow. In this analysis all the other effects are included in contrast to the way for 
the determination of FAE_i parameter. For the illustration purposes the total demand 
comparative flow is provided in this section (Figure 4-5), the rest can be found in 
Appendix B.   
Table 4-1 Simulation design for sensitivity analysis of FAE_i 
RUN # FAE_i 
1 0.0001 
2 0.0007 
3 0.0013 
4 0.0019 
5 0.0025 
 
In Figure 4-5, it is seen that the growth is highly dependent on this parameter; this 
is also a known issue. Thus, the estimation of this parameter is very important. 
However, as mentioned before, this parameter is determined consistent with WOMi and 
assigned to the competitor as same as the firm. Also note that, the value assigned for the 
parameter is between values 3 and 4. The curves 3,4 and 5 are close to each other, 
whereas 1 and 2 are very apart. 
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Figure 4-5 Sensitivity analysis for FAE_i (FDF_1) 
For the word of mouth coefficient, the range 0.1 – 0.01 is tested under the base 
case conditions. The simulation design is represented in Table 4-2. Similar to the FAE_i 
analysis, the comparative graphs are taken for the word of mouth effect, advertising 
effect and total demand flow (Total demand flow can be seen from Figure 4-6, the 
others are available in the Appendix C.).   
Table 4-2 Simulation design for sensitivity analysis of WOMi 
RUN # WOMi 
1 0.01 
2 0.0325 
3 0.055 
4 0.0775 
5 0.1 
 
The growth rate is also highly dependent on WOMi. The difference between the 
curves is getting smaller after 3rd simulation run and the selected value of the parameter 
is within this range.  
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Figure 4-6 Sensitivity analysis for WOMi (FDF_1) 
The learning curve strength is another parameter tested in this section. The 
suggested values for this parameter is 0.3 – 0.5 in the literature. Therefore 5 times 
model is run between the suggested ranges (Table 4-3). The firm’s cost, firm’s price and 
firm’s demand flow are checked during the 5 simulations. Firm’s demand flow is 
illustrated in Figure 4-7, whereas the others are illustrated in the Appendix D. It is 
obvious that the model does not strongly depend on this parameter within the suggested 
range. Therefore, the initially assigned value is appropriate. 
Table 4-3 Simulation design for sensitivity analysis of learning curve strength (a) 
RUN # a 
1 0.3 
2 0.35 
3 0.4 
4 0.45 
5 0.5 
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Figure 4-7 Sensitivity analysis for learning curve strength (FDF_1) 
The initial experience is also simulated 5 times within the range of 300 000 – 800 
000. Table 4-4 represents the simulation design and Figure 4-8 represents the effect of 
this parameter of firm’s demand flow. Note that firm’s cost and firm’s price are 
illustrated in the appendix. Similar to the learning curve strength, the model does not 
strongly depend on this parameter and the assigned initial values (500 000 = two year’s 
total capacity) is proper for the possible scenarios. 
Table 4-4 Simulation design for sensitivity analysis of initial production experience 
(Fexp0_1) 
RUN # Fexp0_1 
1 300 000 
2 425 000 
3 550 000 
4 675 000 
5 800 000 
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Figure 4-8 Sensitivity analysis for initial production experience (FDF_1) 
There are also other tests in structure oriented behavior tests such as modified-
behavior prediction test. Since the data is essential for these tests, they are skipped. 
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5. SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
In this section basically two groups of scenarios are presented and results are 
discussed. The first group deals with various pricing strategies whereas second group 
deals with the advantages and the disadvantages of the second product launching under 
different market structures (monopoly and duopoly).  
5.1. Pricing Strategies 
The first scenario group compares the pricing strategies. In the simulation design 
the firm is designated as the first mover and competitor is designated as the second 
mover (late entrant). The firm can apply two different pricing strategies: (1) skimming 
pricing and (2) penetration pricing. As a response to the skimming pricing, the 
competitor either matches the price or cuts the price (aggressive response). On the other 
hand, as a response to the penetration strategy the competitor matches the price since 
the price levels are already very low. This design is replicated for the different entry 
times of the competitor; recall that the firm enters to the market in period 0. What if the 
competitor moves one period later, two periods later or three periods later? This group 
of scenarios is also replicated for different market segments. First, the scenarios are run 
in segment 2 and then the same scenarios are run in segment 3. Figure 5-1 illustrates the 
scenario design.  
In order to compare these three scenarios, the profit levels of the firm and 
competitor, the profit difference (in percentages) and the market share of the companies 
are considered. Based on these reports the advantages and disadvantages are discussed. 
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Figure 5-1 Scenario design 1 
5.1.1. Pricing Scenarios for Segment 2 
In the case of skimming – matching, the firm sets a high price to increase the 
profit, while decreasing the advantage of high volume sales and lower costs. As a 
response the competitor sets its price at the same level as the firm.  
The initial price of the firm is set as 800. Recall that this value is directly related 
to the market segment and its associated product design quality (segment 2 – product 2). 
The competitor’s price is assigned based on the price level of the firm. The cost 
sensitivity parameters (FSPC and CSPC) are set as 0.02, since this strategy and 
response are not cost-dependent. The competitor sensitivity parameters (FSPCP and 
CSPCP) are set as 0.2, which implies an intermediate dependence on the competitor.  
Table 5-1 Results for skimming-matching case (segment 2) 
Metrics 
CET1 (Year) 
Firm’s 
profit (1)  
(million $) 
Competitor’s  
profit (2)  
(million $) 
Profit ratio 
((1-2)/1)  
 (%) 
Firm’s 
market 
share (%) 
1 209,433.79 188,846.14 9.83 52.00 
2 218,343.57 167,404.83 23.32 55.00 
3 228,419.07 142,344.34 37.68 58.00 
                                                 
1 Competitor’s entry time 
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In the second scenario, the firm also sets a high price. However, in contrast to the 
previous case, the competitor responds aggressively by decreasing the price level of the 
competitor.  
The initial price of the firm is set as 800 similar to the previous case. However, 
the competitor cuts the firm’s price approximately by 15%. The other parameters are 
kept the same as in the previous case except the competitor’s “competitor’s price 
sensitivity parameter”. This parameter is decreased, because the competitor does not act 
dependent on the leader’s price (firm’s price) any more instead it aggressively cuts the 
price. Therefore this parameter is set as 0.02, which represents a low dependence. 
Table 5-2 Results for skimming-price cut case (segment 2) 
Metrics 
CET (year) 
Firm’s 
profit (1)  
(million $) 
Competitor’s  
profit (2)  
(million $) 
Profit ratio 
((1-2)/1)  
 (%) 
Firm’s 
market 
share (%) 
1 185,560.33 195,395.46 - 5.30 49.00 
2 192,151.63 166,500.72 13.34 52.00 
3 196,066.70 135,110.02 31.08 55.00 
 
In the penetration strategy, the firm sets a low level price in order to increase the 
sales volume and use the advantage of decreasing costs due to learning curve and high 
capacity usage ratio. As a response, the competitor also sets lower price as long as its 
own cost allows. Recall that there is a threshold for the prices for both of the firms; at 
least a profit margin of 5% is desired.   
The initial price of the firm is set at 700. The competitor’s price is assigned 
dependent on the price level of the firm. In this case, the cost parameters have a vital 
importance. Therefore they are set as 0.5 (which represents a high dependence on the 
costs). On the other hand, the competitor’s price parameters are set as 0.02.  
Table 5-3 Results for penetration-matching case (segment 2) 
Metrics 
CET (year) 
Firm’s 
profit (1)  
(million $) 
Competitor’s  
profit (2)  
(million $) 
Profit ratio 
((1-2)/1) 
(%) 
Firm’s 
market 
share (%) 
1 49,138.18 39,459.53 19.69 55.00 
2 51,799.67 32,875.24 36.53 59.00 
3 53,008.09 26,650.36 49.72 63.00 
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In order to compare the results of these three scenarios summary graphs are 
drawn. Firm’s profit, competitor’s profit, profit difference (%) and firm’s market share 
can be seen in Table 5-1 through Table 5-3 and in Figure 5-2 through Figure 5-5.  
Figure 5-2 Firm’s profit under three scenarios (segment 2) 
 
Figure 5-3 Competitor’s profit under three scenarios (segment 2) 
The common point for the firm’s profit is the positive correlation with the entry 
time of the competitor, whereas from the competitor’s perspective there is a negative 
correlation. This means as the time lag increases the competitor looses profit while the 
firm wins. 
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The firm’s profit level has the highest values for skimming-matching case among 
the scenarios. The underlying reason is keeping the high levels even after the entry of 
the competitor. If the competitor responds aggressively by decreasing the price level 
then the firm’s profit decreases. In the final scenario, firm’s profit level is very low due 
to small profit margins. When these three cases are considered from the competitor’s 
perspective; both initial two scenarios are very profitable. In contrast to the firm, the 
second response results with the highest profit if the competitor enters the market in the 
first or second period. In the penetration-matching case, the profit level is low for both 
firms.  
Figure 5-4 Profit difference under three scenarios (segment 2)  
To make the inferences clear, firm’s market share and profit difference are 
compared finally. The profit difference observed in penetration-matching scenario has 
the highest value among the others. In other words, this strategy is the best strategy in 
order to beat the competitor. However, the trade-off is with the decreasing profit levels. 
Skimming-price cut is another extreme in terms of profit ratio. In this case the 
competitor has the advantage, while still keeping the profit levels high. These 
conclusions are also supported by the firm’s market share data (Figure 5-5). 
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Figure 5-5 Firm’s market share under three scenarios (segment 2) 
In order to validate these results, testing them with a different segment would be 
appropriate in order to confirm. Therefore, in the next section the same design is applied 
to segment 3 and the results are discussed. 
5.1.2. Pricing Scenarios for Segment 3 
In skimming – matching scenario for segment 3, the initial price of the firm is set 
as 1800 and the competitor’s price is defined dependent on this value and the rest of the 
parameters are kept the same.  
Table 5-4 Results for skimming-matching case (segment 3) 
Metrics 
CET (year) 
Firm’s 
profit (1)  
(million $) 
Competitor’s  
profit (2)  
(million $) 
Profit ratio 
((1-2)/1)  
 (%) 
Firm’s 
market 
share (%) 
1 153,142.32 134,455.59 12.20 52.00 
2 161,017.31 116,784.64 27.47 55.00 
3 170,139.03 97,241.10 97.21 59.00 
 
In the second scenario the firm’s price is kept at 1800 and the competitor cuts this 
price approximately by 15 %.  
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Table 5-5 Results for skimming-price cut case (segment 2) 
Metrics 
CET (year) 
Firm’s 
profit (1)  
(million $) 
Competitor’s  
profit (2)  
(million $) 
Profit ratio 
((1-2)/1)   
 (%) 
Firm’s 
market 
share (%) 
1 125,899.16 128,417.29 -2.00 49.00 
2 129,775.60 103,584.30 20.18 52.00 
3 138,313.30 81,422.95 41.13 57.00 
 
In the final scenario, the firm set the price at a lower level (1300) and the 
competitor matches the price. 
Table 5-6 Results for penetration-matching case (segment 2) 
Metrics 
CET (year) 
Firm’s 
profit (1)  
(million $) 
Competitor’s  
profit (2)  
(million $) 
Profit ratio 
((1-2)/1)  
(%) 
Firm’s 
market 
share (%) 
1 49,094.41 28,530.98 41.88 63.00 
2 57,308.28 18,810.06 67.17 74.00 
3 63,023.53 11,794.05 81.28 82.00 
 
For market segment 3, firm’s profit, competitor’s profit, profit difference (%) and 
firm’s market share are illustrated in Table 5-4 through Table 5-6 and in Figure 5-6 
through Figure 5-9. 
 
Figure 5-6 Firm’s profit under three scenarios (segment 3) 
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Figure 5-7 Competitor’s profit under three scenarios (segment 3) 
 
Figure 5-8 Profit difference under three scenarios (segment 3) 
Based on the results for segment 2 and 3, it can be said that profit levels for case 1 
and 2 are higher compared to that of case 3. This means skimming strategy brings a 
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to a little decrease in the profit level. On the other hand, this leads to an increase in the 
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purpose of reaching a large installed base and having a lower cost. This strategy results 
in lower costs and higher market share compared to the other two cases.  
 
Figure 5-9 Firm’s market share under three scenarios (segment 3) 
5.2. Product Launch Analysis in Monopoly and Duopoly Market Cases 
In the second group of scenarios the new product launching strategies are 
discussed under different pricing strategies and different market structures (monopoly 
and duopoly). The scenarios are repeated for seven different launching times for the 
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considered (0, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10). These scenarios are run under three different pricing 
strategies. These pricing strategies are: (1) skimming, (2) skimming but the firm and the 
competitor (if present) make a discount for their first products by increasing cost 
sensitivity parameter after the launching of the second product and (3) penetration 
pricing. Each design is replicated for other group of segments in order to check the 
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launched to the fourth segment. This section is concluded with the comparison of the 
results under these two different segment combinations. 
In each scenario total profit at the end of 12 years is calculated and used as the 
performance metric. The scenarios are also run for 24 years. However, since there was 
not a significant difference is observed, 12 years is preferred as the time horizon.  
For each scenario group a label is defined that represents parameters. Table 5-7 
illustrates an empty label.  
Table 5-7 Empty label and definition box 
Scenario ID:…… 
Competitor Firm 
CET:  FET:  
Segment:  Segment:  
Price:  Price:  
SPC:  SPC:  
SPCP:  SPCP:  
CET_2:  FET_2:  
Segment:  Segment:  
Price:  Price:  
SPC:  SPC:  
SPCP:   SPCP:   
 
Each scenario has an ID that defines the segment combination, environment and 
the pricing strategy. The first entity represents the segment combination (if 1 then 2&3, 
if 2 then 3&4). The second entity stands for the environment; monopoly or duopoly. 
Finally the third entity symbolizes the pricing strategy (can be S1, S2, or S3).  For 
example, 1-DS3 means, in duopoly, the products are launched to segments 2 and 3, and 
the third pricing strategy is used. 
5.2.1. Analysis in Monopoly 
The three pricing strategies are applied in sequence and replicated for the second 
segment groups. First, the segments 2 and 3, then 3 and 4 are represented. 
FET(CET): Firm’s (Competitor’s) entry 
time. 
FET_2 (CET_2): Firm’s (Competitor’s) 
second product’s launch time. 
SPC: Sensitivity of the price to the cost. 
SPCP: Sensitivity of the price to the 
competitor’s price. 
Segment: Represents the market 
segment that the product is launched 
for. 
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5.2.1.1. Analysis in Monopoly for the First Group of Segments 
The results for the skimming pricing (without a discount) are illustrated with 
Table 5-8 and Figure 5-10.  
Table 5-8 1-MS1 results 
Scenario ID: 1-MS1    
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Profit 
CET: 50 FET: 0  0 292,665 
Segment:  Segment: 2  2 286,599 
Price:  Price: 800  4 258,839 
SPC:  SPC: 0.02  6 242,494 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 240,534 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 236,201 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 239,557 
Price:  Price: 1800    
SPC:  SPC: 0.02    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-10 Firm’s profit in 1-MS1 
In this pricing strategy there is no pressure on the profit margin; in other words, 
the profit margin is high and is not affected from the entry of the new product (FET_2).  
Therefore, the best policy depends on the settings of the segments (segment size and 
profit margin). Under the first segment group, launching the second product seems as 
the best strategy. Postponing the launch time results with a decrease as can be seen from 
Figure 5-10. The underlying reason is the higher profit margin of the second product.  
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When the skimming strategy with a discount (with the entry of the second 
product) is used, the increase in the FET_2, first leads to a decrease then to an increase 
as illustrated in Figure 5-11 and Table 5-9. The firm should decide whether to launch 
the second product immediately or to postpone the launch. A simultaneous entry is 
advantageous, because the sales volume of the first product is high due to the decreased 
price and the profit margin of the second product is very high and the firm uses the 
advantage of this high margin during 12 years. However, if the second product enters to 
market in years 2, 4, or 6, the duration during which the firm uses the advantage of third 
segment’s higher profit margin decreases. Furthermore, the first product’s installed base 
does not reach a high level due to the high price. In that situation, the firm neither has 
the advantage of skimming strategy in a more profitable segment nor the high volume 
installed base that creates a high word of mouth effect. On the other hand, launching the 
second product at a late time becomes advantageous due to very high installed base in a 
very large segment. Note that the second product’s entry decreases the size of segment 2 
by 37.5 %. Since the second product’s launch is postponed the segment keeps its 
beginning size. In this situation the firm may not be able to use the advantage of a high 
margin but instead has the advantage of a large and stable installed base. In summary, in 
one extreme the firm uses the advantage of high profit at a longer time, whereas in the 
other extreme the firm uses the advantage of a high installed base.  
Table 5-9 1-MS2 results 
Scenario ID: 1-MS2    
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Profit 
CET: 50 FET: 0  0 203,279 
Segment:  Segment: 2  2 144,816 
Price:  Price: 800  4 121,320 
SPC:  SPC: Time >F2-1 Then 0.5  6 110,771 
     Else 0.02  8 127,527 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  10 170,981 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  50 239,557 
Segment:  Segment: 3    
Price:  Price: 1800    
SPC:  SPC: 0.02    
SPCP:   SPCP:      
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Figure 5-11 Firm’s profit in 1-MS2 
Table 5-10 1-MS3 results 
Scenario ID:1-MS3    
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Profit 
CET: 50 FET: 0  0 201,688 
Segment:  Segment: 2  2 150,992 
Price:  Price: 700  4 122,192 
SPC:  SPC: 0.5  6 92,644 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 73,977 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 50  10 57,223 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 55,444 
Price:  Price: 1800    
SPC:  SPC: 0.02    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5-12 Firm’s profit in 1-MS3 
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If the firm uses a penetration strategy, the best policy is launching the second 
product immediately since the high profit margin of the new product increases the 
firm’s total profit. This is also supported by Figure 5-12 and Table 5-10. 
5.2.1.2. Analysis in Monopoly for the Second Group of Segments 
In the skimming price strategy the firm’s first product’s profit margin is kept at a 
high level. However, since the market size of segment four is very low, launching a 
product to that segment by allocating the capacity becomes a bad policy although the 
profit margin is higher. In summary, the best policy is to postpone the new launch and 
concentrate on the initial segment. Table 5-11 and Figure 5-13 display the results. 
Table 5-11 2-MS1 results 
Scenario ID: 2-MS1    
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Profit 
CET: 50 FET: 0  0 382,919 
Segment:  Segment: 3  2 371,145 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 365,237 
SPC:  SPC: 0.02  6 376,687 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 407,593 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 455,634 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 476,020 
Price:  Price: 3500    
SPC:  SPC: 0.02    
SPCP:   SPCP: -    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-13 Firm’s profit in 2-MS1 
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If the firm makes a discount with the entry of the new product, the firm’s profit 
first decreases and then increases as the second product’s entry time increases (Figure 
5-14 and Table 5-12). The reason behind this is the same as in 1-MS2. In summary, the 
firm should launch the product in period zero or postpone the launch.  
Table 5-12 2-MS2 Results 
Scenario ID: 2-MS2    
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Profit 
CET: 50 FET: 0  0 210,328 
Segment:  Segment: 3  2 187,922 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 174,435 
SPC:  SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 182,121 
     Else 0.02  8 225,503 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  10 313,545 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  50 476,020 
Segment:  Segment: 4    
Price:  Price: 3500    
SPC:  SPC: 0.02    
SPCP:   SPCP: -    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-14 Firm’s profit in 2-MS2 
 
In the penetration strategy, launching the second product as early as possible is the 
best policy as supported by Figure 5-15 and Table 5-13. As mentioned in the previous 
group of segments, the high profit margin of the second products leads to an increase in 
the profit level. 
 
Firm's Profit (2-MS2)
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
0 2 4 6 8 10 50
FET_2
10
00
 $
  105 
Table 5-13 2-MS3 results 
Scenario ID: 2-MS3    
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Profit 
CET: 50 FET: 0  0 212,609 
Segment:  Segment: 3  2 188,370 
Price:  Price: 1300  4 167,611 
SPC:  SPC: 0.5  6 148,558 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 134,605 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 124,039 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 120,716 
Price:  Price: 3500    
SPC:  SPC: 0.02    
SPCP:   SPCP: -    
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Figure 5-15 Firm’s profit in 2-MS3 
After explaining the results for two different segment combinations separately, 
comparing the results would be appropriate. The results observed for the skimming and 
a discount pricing strategy and the penetration pricing strategy follows the same trend. 
In the second (skimming-discount) strategy, in both cases, an early launch or a late 
launch is observed as the best policies. In the penetration, launching the second product 
as early as possible becomes the best strategy. However, for the second strategy the best 
policies do not match. In the first group the best policy is launching the product whereas 
in the second group the best policy is not launching the product immediately. The 
underlying reason is the high dependency to the segment parameters. This strategy is 
highly dependent on the market size and segment profitability because the profit margin 
is never forced to decrease to the cost level. Also note that there is no effect of the 
competitor. In summary, launching the second product becomes a good strategy for the 
first segment groups, since the profit margin is high (Figure 5-10). In contrast, 
postponing becomes a good strategy for the second group, since the profit reaches a 
  106 
relatively high level all contributed by segment 3 with no contribution of segment 4 
(Figure 5-13). 
5.2.2. Analysis in Duopoly 
The three pricing strategies are applied in sequence and replicated for the second 
segment groups. Recall that the strategies are also replicated for different entry times of 
the competitor (CET). In this section the 3-D graphs that also illustrate the competitor’s 
different entry times are provided both for the firm and the competitor. 
5.2.2.1. Analysis in Duopoly for the First Group of Segments 
The results for the first group of segments with the skimming price strategy are 
illustrated both with a table (Table 5-14) and 3-D graphs (Figure 5-16 and Figure 5-17).  
From the firm’s perspective, launching the second product is a profitable policy. 
As the competitor enters the market late the profit level of the firm increases. However, 
there may become some small fluctuations in the profit level. The reasons behind these 
fluctuations are the competitor’s short-term effect on the firm’s delivery delay, market 
segment parameters and installed base volume. Note that these fluctuations are very 
small and therefore negligible.  
From the competitor’s perspective, competitor’s profit is decreasing as it enters 
the market later. The effect of firm’s second product is more complex. As the firm 
introduces its second product at a later time this brings an advantage to the competitor. 
But, there is a sudden increase in the competitor’s profit from period 0 (when the firm’s 
second product enters in period 0) to 1 (when the firm’s second product enters in period 
0). Even if the competitor is not present in period 0 or 1, this difference is still valid. In 
Figure 5-17, this sudden increase can be seen from the left part of the surface.  
If the competitor is not present in period 0, then why is it affected from the firm’s 
earlier policy? The answer of this question is the stability of the environment. If the firm 
launches its second product simultaneously with the first product, then the firm would 
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enter a stable environment. The market size would not differentiate at a later time with 
the entry of the second product. The market would reach its final composition at the 
beginning. In this situation the firm would not lose a part of its installed base and would 
not spend money for the people who will switch in the next periods. However, if the 
firm launches the second product in the first period, then it would lose a part of its 
installed base. In other words, it would lose a part of its competitive power. Therefore, 
this would increase the competitor’s competitive power whenever it enters the market. 
Of course the effect would be higher in the earlier periods. The difference is less if the 
competitor enters in period 10, but it still exists. We define this situation as the start-up 
problem. Another issue is about the firm. Firm is not much affected from this situation, 
because in either case it will win by introducing a new product to a more profitable 
segment. In some situations the firm may increase its profit by launching in later 
periods. This a different start up problem that is based on segment parameters (as in 2-
DS1). 
Table 5-14 1-DS1 results 
Scenario ID: 1-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 0 FET: 0  0 284,046 100,284 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 280,288 166,516 
Price: 800 Price: 800  4 240,154 164,183 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 211,539 167,220 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 197,060 175,992 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 194,365 189,399 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 203,626 203,626 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
        
Scenario ID:1-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 2 FET: 0  0 288,039 82,622 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 283,747 141,574 
Price: 750 Price: 800  4 246,513 137,003 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 221,030 136,660 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 208,113 142,928 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 206,830 154,399 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 217,874 167,260 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Scenario ID: 1-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 4 FET: 0  0 293,260 57,070 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 288,401 99,628 
Price: 710 Price: 800  4 252,798 99,830 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 232,960 95,098 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 224,637 96,713 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-10-50  10 225,728 104,707 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 233,559 115,375 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 1-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 6 FET: 0  0 293,862 31,918 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 288,824 57,646 
Price: 672 Price: 800  4 258,640 57,488 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 240,468 56,719 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 237,812 53,194 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 240,443 57,066 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 240,553 65,180 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
     
Scenario ID: 1-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 8 FET: 0  0 294,206 12,632 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 287,596 24,596 
Price: 640 Price: 800  4 261,132 24,225 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 244,777 23,591 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 241,780 22,437 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 240,408 22,493 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 240,483 26,980 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 1-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 10 FET: 0  0 292,843 1,448 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 286,916 4,578 
Price: 610 Price: 800  4 259,451 4,283 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 243,228 3,971 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 241,342 3,537 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 240,085 3,601 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 239,916 4,942 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Figure 5-16 Firm’s profit in 1-DS1 
 
 
 
Figure 5-17 Competitor’s profit in 1-DS1 
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In this scenario, the firm and the competitor use the skimming strategy, and the 
firm makes a discount just before the second product and the competitor makes a 
discount just after the second product by increasing the cost sensitivity parameters. 
Results are displayed in Table 5-15. 
From the firm’s perspective, as the competitor enters the market late the firm’s 
profit first increases and then decreases. Up to 6th period the late entry will provide an 
advantage, however after this, it becomes a disadvantage. Because, in these time 
periods, presence of the competitor decreases the delivery delay effect of the firm, and 
the firm’s demand increases. Another point is the launch of the second product. It is 
similar to that of in monopoly. The firm should either launch it in the early periods or 
later periods (Figure 5-18).  
On the competitor’s side, there is again a start up problem but it is smoother than 
that of the skimming price strategy scenario, because the profit margins are getting 
smaller and building a large installed base is easier. Also, as expected, the late entry of 
the competitor and the early launch of the firm’s second product lead to a decrease in 
the competitor’s profit (Figure 5-19).  
 
Table 5-15 1-DS2 Results 
Scenario ID:1-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 0 FET: 0  0 212,873 26,661 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 170,260 45,898 
Price:  Price: 800  4 129,726 55,717 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 116,043 74,429 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 122,289 106,462 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 148,638 149,947 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-10-
50  50 203,626 203,626 
Segment:  Segment: 3     
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Scenario ID:1-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 2 FET: 0  0 238,035 14,682 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 169,213 35,899 
Price:  Price: 800  4 131,539 42,187 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 117,094 56,002 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 124,651 81,646 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 155,584 118,869 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-10-
50  50 218,077 167,547 
Segment:  Segment: 3     
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
        
Scenario ID:1-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 4 FET: 0  0 241,853 7,388 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 177,784 22,018 
Price:  Price: 800  4 136,074 27,399 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 121,693 33,140 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 133,675 49,099 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 167,455 76,137 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-10-
50  50 235,216 115,996 
Segment:  Segment: 3     
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
        
Scenario ID:1-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 6 FET: 0  0 221,163 2,735 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 168,411 11,364 
Price:  Price: 800  4 143,870 13,811 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 130,756 16,386 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 144,364 21,234 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 179,084 37,031 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-10-
50  50 244,811 65,903 
Segment:  Segment: 3     
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Scenario ID:1-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 8 FET: 0  0 220,895 -90 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 166,617 4,020 
Price:  Price: 800  4 145,674 4,939 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 132,008 5,803 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 149,261 6,837 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 186,034 10,379 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-10-
50  50 241,982 27,446 
Segment:  Segment: 3     
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID:1-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 10 FET: 0  0 213,946 -1,922 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 157,907 -571 
Price:  Price: 800  4 134,752 -444 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 125,575 -277 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 141,597 -13 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 186,374 133 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-10-
50  50 240,080 5,041 
Segment:  Segment: 3     
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Figure 5-18 Firm’s profit in 1-DS2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-19 Competitor’s profit in 1-DS2 
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In the penetration strategy, the firm’s and the competitor’s profit levels are low as 
can be seen from Table 5-16. From the firm’s perspective, as the competitor enters the 
market late the firm’s profit first increases and then decreases similar to the previous 
scenario. The early launch of the second product brings a great profit advantage to the 
firm (Figure 5-20). 
There is again a start up problem for the competitor. But in this case it is not 
smooth as in the previous case. The prices are still low and it is also easy to build a high 
volume installed base. However, the number of people who would switch will increase. 
This leads to a sharp start up problem in this case. Note that after the start up problem 
the competitor’s profit level is not affected much from the entrance time of the second 
product. The underlying reason is the large number of potential customers due to the 
low price levels. Finally, the competitor’s profit decreases as its entrance time increases 
(Figure 5-21).   
Table 5-16 Results in 1-DS3 
Scenario ID: 1-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 0 FET: 0  0 212,398 26,861 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 162,002 41,362 
Price:  Price: 700  4 115,578 40,491 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 84,405 40,971 
SPCP: 0.02 SPCP: 0.02  8 63,547 42,577 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 49,468 44,440 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 45,795 45,795 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
        
Scenario ID: 1-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 2 FET: 0  0 219,653 14,000 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 166,297 30,993 
Price:  Price: 700  4 123,732 27,092 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 93,289 27,134 
SPCP: 0.02 SPCP: 0.02  8 69,881 29,455 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 54,533 31,575 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 51,796 32,880 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Scenario ID: 1-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 4 FET: 0  0 217,001 7,198 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 162,574 18,521 
Price:  Price: 700  4 122,964 17,242 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 92,976 16,751 
SPCP: 0.02 SPCP: 0.02  8 72,547 17,209 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 57,671 18,944 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 53,673 20,607 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 1-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 6 FET: 0  0 214,521 2,575 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 163,350 9,522 
Price:  Price: 700  4 121,797 8,074 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 93,904 8,303 
SPCP: 0.02 SPCP: 0.02  8 73,412 8,213 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-10-50  10 58,827 9,116 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 55,163 10,405 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 1-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 8 FET: 0  0 204,394 -130 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 154,200 3,317 
Price:  Price: 700  4 122,148 2,466 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 93,564 2,259 
SPCP: 0.02 SPCP: 0.02  8 73,976 2,449 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 58,446 2,829 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 58,444 3,774 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 1-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 10 FET: 0  0 201,836 -1,927 
Segment: 2 Segment: 2  2 151,029 -815 
Price:  Price: 700  4 122,257 -1,084 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 92,710 -1,252 
SPCP: 0.02 SPCP: 0.02  8 74,011 -1,255 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 57,223 -1,115 
Segment:  Segment: 3  50 55,444 -666 
Price:  Price: 1800     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Figure 5-20 Firm’s profit in 1-DS3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-21 Competitor’s profit in 1-DS3 
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5.2.2.2. Analysis in Duopoly for the Second Group of Segments 
From the firm’s perspective, launching the second product is a profitable policy. 
As the competitor enters the market late the profit level of the firm increases at the same 
level as for in the first group of segments. However, there is an apparent start up 
problem for the firm in this case. The start up problem is different from the other cases. 
In this case firm’s start up problem arises in period 2. In this case, if the firm launches 
the second product to the market, the profit is maximized (Figure 5-22). Note that the 
numeric results are represented in Table 5-17. 
From the competitor’s perspective, the competitor’s profit is decreasing as it 
enters the market later. There is a start up problem similar to the first group of 
segments. Finally, as in every scenario, late entry results in less profit (Figure 5-23).  
Table 5-17 Results in 2-DS1 
Scenario ID: 2-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 0 FET: 0  0 196,748 79,326 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 210,526 121,784 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 181,287 120,943 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 159,123 122,908 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 145,848 128,158 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 141,653 137,379 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 147,578 147,578 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 2 FET: 0  0 201,723 63,936 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 218,444 99,492 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 189,400 97,170 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 167,915 97,056 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 155,620 100,499 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 153,030 107,760 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 160,688 116,662 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Scenario ID: 2-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 4 FET: 0  0 209,659 43,875 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 232,290 67,513 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 201,799 68,037 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 181,093 65,567 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 170,676 66,467 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 170,502 70,850 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 180,046 77,364 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 6 FET: 0  0 217,917 24,705 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 245,934 37,949 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 215,234 38,212 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 193,328 37,975 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 184,797 36,442 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 187,323 38,292 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 199,474 41,945 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 8 FET: 0  0 224,435 10,059 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 256,200 16,005 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 225,336 16,130 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 203,262 15,996 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 194,235 15,464 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 198,676 15,150 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 213,570 17,097 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS1     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 10 FET: 0  0 228,217 994 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 261,649 2,678 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 230,711 2,712 
SPC: 0.02 SPC: 0.02  6 208,545 2,668 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  8 199,441 2,486 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 203,907 2,206 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 220,908 2,772 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Figure 5-22 Firm’s profit in 2-DS1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-23 Competitor’s profit in 2-DS1 
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In the skimming and discount scenario, as the competitor enters the market late, 
the firm’s profit first increases and then decreases as in the first group of segments as 
illustrated in Table 5-18 and Figure 5-24. Up to 6th period the late entry will provide an 
advantage, however, after this point, it becomes a disadvantage for the firm. Because, in 
these time periods, presence of the competitor decreases the delivery delay effect of the 
firm, and firm’s demand increases. Launching the second product is profitable for the 
firm in the early periods and in the late ones.  
From the competitor’s perspective, there is again a start up problem but it is 
smoother compared to that of the skimming price strategy scenario as can be seen from 
Figure 5-25. The underlying reasons are stated in 1-DS2.  Similar to the other scenarios, 
the late entry of the competitor and the early launch of the firm’s second product lead to 
a decrease in the competitor’s profit. 
Table 5-18 Results in 2-DS2 
Scenario ID: 2-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp. Pr. 
CET: 0 FET: 0  0 142,070 23,877 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 130,062 37,064 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 108,464 47,043 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 97,516 63,397 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 99,366 86,805 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 112,927 116,398 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-
10-50  50 147,578 147,578 
Segment:  Segment: 4     
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 2 FET: 0  0 150,520 13,061 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 133,731 24,785 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 107,891 34,772 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 97,377 48,523 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 100,556 68,854 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 113,357 90,714 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-
10-50  50 138,024 109,151 
Segment:  Segment: 4     
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Scenario ID: 2-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 4 FET: 0  0 157,226 4,898 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 145,120 10,686 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 116,477 16,965 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 106,555 24,639 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 110,764 38,098 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 131,108 56,062 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-
10-50  50 180,067 77,337 
Segment:  Segment: 4     
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 6 FET: 0  0 160,754 607 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 153,198 3,101 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 124,740 6,119 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 109,886 9,301 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 116,279 16,015 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 140,798 27,532 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-
10-50  50 199,530 42,124 
Segment:  Segment: 4     
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
        
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 8 FET: 0  0 162,536 -1,442 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 158,187 -500 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 131,283 609 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 115,765 1,894 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 117,358 3,143 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 146,356 8,062 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-
10-50  50 213,607 17,287 
Segment:  Segment: 4     
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Scenario ID: 2-DS2     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 10 FET: 0  0 163,530 -2,470 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 157,759 -2,204 
Price:  Price: 1800  4 132,916 -1,949 
SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5 SPC: 
Time >F2-1 
Then 0.5  6 118,886 -1,625 
  Else 0.02   Else 0.02  8 120,753 -1,295 
SPCP: 0.2 SPCP: 0.2  10 145,661 -997 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 
0-2-4-6-8-
10-50  50 213,312 1,243 
Segment:  Segment: 4     
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-24 Firm’s profit in 2-DS2 
In the penetration strategy, as the competitor enters the market late, the firm’s 
profit first increases and then decreases. From the competitor’s perspective, there is 
again a major start up problem for the competitor. After the first period the competitor’s 
profit does not fluctuated much.  As a final issue, the competitor’s profit decreases as it 
enters later. The results are displayed in Table 5-19 and Figure 5-26 and Figure 5-27. 
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Figure 5-25 Competitor’s profit in 2-DS2 
 
Table 5-19 Results in 2-DS3 
Scenario ID: 2-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 0 FET: 0  0 141,686 24,265 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 123,695 35,365 
Price:  Price: 1300  4 94,859 34,975 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 71,462 35,443 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 54,387 36,737 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 42,557 38,286 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 39,627 39,627 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 2 FET: 0  0 151,172 12,470 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 137,670 19,164 
Price:  Price: 1300  4 110,029 17,145 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 87,168 16,649 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 70,669 17,248 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 59,609 18,098 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 57,323 18,795 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Scenario ID: 2-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 4 FET: 0  0 157,670 4,581 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 146,992 7,667 
Price:  Price: 1300  4 118,593 7,018 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 96,153 5,859 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 79,907 5,976 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 69,138 6,438 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 67,018 6,826 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 6 FET: 0  0 161,055 471 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 151,741 1,772 
Price:  Price: 1300  4 123,040 1,472 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 100,208 962 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 84,094 787 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 73,455 1,029 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 71,451 1,264 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 8 FET: 0  0 162,621 -1,488 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 153,869 -960 
Price:  Price: 1300  4 125,024 -1,082 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 101,946 -1,289 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 85,811 -1,390 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 75,236 -1,273 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 73,287 -1,110 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
        
Scenario ID: 2-DS3     
Competitor Firm  FET_2 Firm's Pr. Comp Pr. 
CET: 10 FET: 0  0 163,296 -2,480 
Segment: 3 Segment: 3  2 154,756 -2,304 
Price:  Price: 1300  4 125,863 -2,343 
SPC: 0.5 SPC: 0.5  6 102,687 -2,406 
SPCP:  SPCP: -  8 86,507 -2,446 
CET_2: 50 FET_2: 0-2-4-6-8-10-50  10 76,000 -2,420 
Segment:  Segment: 4  50 74,089 -2,314 
Price:  Price: 3500     
SPC:  SPC: 0.02     
SPCP:   SPCP:  -     
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Figure 5-26 Firm’s profit in 2-DS3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-27 Competitor’s profit in 2-DS3 
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After explaining the results for two different segment combinations separately, 
comparing the results would be appropriate.  
For the skimming price strategy:  launching the second product is a profitable 
policy from the firm’s perspective. As the competitor enters the market late, the profit 
level of the firm increases. Also the competitor’s profit is decreasing as it enters the 
market later and there is a start up problem. These points are common in both segment 
combinations. However, the start up problem for the firm is much more significant and 
different in the second segment combination. (2-DS1)  
In the second pricing strategy (skimming and then a discount) all observations are 
common for both of the segment groups. In brief; from the firm’s perspective, as the 
competitor enters the market late the firm’s profit first increases and then decreases. 
Similar to this result, launch of the second product is advantageous in the early periods 
or in later periods.  From the competitor’s perspective, there is again a start up problem 
(smoother than that of the skimming price strategy scenario) and the late entry of the 
competitor and the early launch of the firm’s second product lead to a decrease in the 
competitor’s profit.  
In the penetration strategy, the observations overlap. As the competitor enters the 
market late, the firm’s profit first increases and then decreases. There is a major start up 
problem for the competitor’s and as the competitor enters late its profit decreases as in 
other scenarios.  
In conclusion, the results observed in every scenario (for different pricing 
strategies) in two segment groups have similar patterns and, these observations 
reinforce the reliability of the results.  
5.2.3. Comparing Monopoly and Duopoly 
In this section, the comparison is performed first based on the pricing strategies. 
Then, the common points observed in all of the pricing strategies are summarized. 
In the skimming strategy, in monopoly, two different successful polices have been 
observed: Launching is observed for the first group of segments whereas not launching 
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is observed for the second group of segments. In duopoly, with the increasing 
competition in all segment combinations launching is observed as the best policy.   
The presence of the competitor has different effects based on the entry time for 
the first group of segments. If the competitor enters in the early periods, this leads to a 
decrease in the firm’s profit, because in the introduction phase especially for the 
skimming strategy there is a high competition. However, if the competitor enters late, 
this results in an increase in the firm’s profit due to the temporary relaxation in the 
firm’s delivery delay.  In the second group of segments no matter when the competitor 
enters, at any time the presence of the competitor decreases the firm’s profit due to 
higher competition (compared to the first group of segments).  
The last observation for the skimming strategy is the following: In monopoly the 
first group of segments, the profit levels are lower than those of the second group of 
segments. However, in duopoly the inverse is valid.  
In the skimming and discount strategy, the increase in the launch time of the 
second product first leads to a decrease and then an increase in the firm’s profit. This 
observation is common both for monopoly and duopoly.  
The presence of the competitor increases the firm’s profit in the first segment 
combination due to the decrease in the delivery delay and second product’s price cut 
effect. However, in the second group of the segments presence of the competitor 
decreases the profit seriously.  
In monopoly, the profit levels are lower than those of the second group of 
segments. However, in duopoly they are higher as in the skimming strategy. 
In the penetration price strategy, launching the second product is observed as the 
best policy for all segment combinations.  
The presence of the competitor has different effects as in the skimming strategy. It 
either keeps the profit at the same level or increases. The underlying reasons are the 
same as in the first pricing strategy. The presence of the competitor leads to a decrease 
in the second group of segments independent from the entry time.  
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Finally, as observed in the rest of the pricing strategies, the profit levels are lower 
than those of the second group of segments. In contrast, they are higher in duopoly.  
There are some common points observed independent from the pricing strategies. 
Does the presence of the competitor decrease the prices always? In other words, in 
duopoly, are the profits higher or lower than in monopoly? The answers of these 
questions are dependent on the amount of the competition. In all pricing strategies, in 
the second segment combination the presence of the competitor always result in a 
decrease in profits in duopoly, because the competition is higher due to the smaller 
segment size. However, for the first segment combinations a generalization is not 
possible. 
The final common observation is about the total profits of segment combinations. 
Should the firm play in the first segment combination or in the second segment 
combination in order to maximize its profit? In monopoly, playing in the second 
segment combinations provide higher profit levels. However in duopoly, due to a high 
level of competition in the second group of segments, playing in the first group of 
segments results in a higher profit level. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study is to build a representative dynamic model in order to 
investigate a duopoly competition in the durable household goods market. 
Representative dynamic models are essential since to test various scenarios becomes 
easier and cheaper with such models. System dynamics is preferred as the methodology 
due to its wide capabilities.  
The modules that are to be included in the model are decided initially. After 
drawing the boundaries, each module is developed separately based on an extended 
literature survey and interviews with the thesis advisor and an expert. The separately 
developed and tested modules are integrated employing proper connections. The model 
is further extended so as to support the entry of new products and different entry times 
to the market. After this phase, the modeling of the market structure is completed and 
the parameter estimation phase is started. The model is validated through the procedure 
that is suggested by Barlas (1996).  
Finally, the scenarios are developed that are to be tested in the model. First the 
various pricing strategies are run in duopoly and then various second product entry 
strategies are considered. 
In the first group of scenarios the firm can apply two different pricing strategies: 
(1) skimming pricing and (2) penetration pricing. As a response to the skimming 
pricing, the competitor either matches the price or cuts the price (aggressive response). 
On the other hand, as a response to the penetration strategy the competitor matches the 
price, since the price levels are already very low. This design is replicated for the 
different entry times of the competitor.  The major conclusions obtained from the first 
group of scenarios are as follows: 
· Consistent results are obtained for both segments 
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· Profit levels are high both in skimming-matching and skimming-price cut 
scenarios compared to that of the case in which penetration pricing strategy is used.  
· If the competitor responds aggressively, this leads to a small decrease in the 
profit level. On the other hand, this leads to an increase in the competitor’s market share 
and profit.  
· Penetration pricing serves the purpose of reaching a large installed base and 
having a lower cost. This strategy results in lower costs and higher market share 
compared to the other two cases. 
In the second  group of scenarios the new product launching strategies are 
discussed under different pricing strategies and different market structures (monopoly 
and duopoly). The scenarios are repeated for seven different launching times for the 
second product and for the competitor’s first product (only in duopoly analysis). These 
scenarios are run under three different pricing strategies. These pricing strategies are: 
(1) skimming, (2) skimming but the firm and the competitor (if present) make a 
discount for their first products by increasing cost sensitivity parameter after the 
launching of the second product and (3) penetration pricing. Each design is replicated 
for other group of segments in order to check the reliability of the scenarios. The major 
findings are stated as follows: 
· In general, the results observed in every scenario in two segment groups have 
similar patterns.  
· For the skimming price strategy:  launching the second product is a profitable 
policy from the firm’s perspective. As the competitor enters the market late, the profit 
level of the firm increases. Also the competitor’s profit is decreasing as it enters the 
market later.  
· In the second pricing strategy, from the firm’s perspective, as the competitor 
enters the market late the firm’s profit first increases and then decreases due to the 
temporary relaxation in the delivery delay. Launch of the second product is 
advantageous in the early periods or in later periods. From the competitor’s perspective, 
the late entry of the competitor and the early launch of the firm’s second product lead to 
a decrease in the competitor’s profit.  
  131 
· In the penetration strategy, as the competitor enters the market late, the firm’s 
profit first increases and then decreases. As the competitor enters late its profit 
decreases as in other scenarios.  
· In monopoly, launching the product to the second segment combinations provide 
higher profit levels. However in duopoly, due to a high level of competition in the 
second group of segments, playing in the first group of segments results in a higher 
profit level. 
For future research, the model can be extended from different aspects: (1) The 
first order delay can be removed from the delivery. (2) The backlog stock can be 
modeled as a separate stock and this one delta time can be removed. (3) Learning curve 
effect can be handled in a different manner, using industry experience and general cost 
decrease expectations that are stated in the contracts in various industries. (4) A new 
product development module can be included to the model as a new module. (5) Cash 
flow can be included, and (6) the model can be extended to an oligopolistic market. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Simulation results for FAE_i and WOMi design  
(Total 11 simulations: Run# 8 and 11 are displayed in the text) 
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Figure A-2 Run #: 2 
 
 
Figure A-3 Run #: 3 
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Figure A-4 Run #: 4 
 
 
Figure A-5 Run #: 5 
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Figure A-6 Run #: 6 
 
 
Figure A-7 Run #: 7 
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Figure A-8 Run #: 9 
 
  
 
Figure A-9 Run #: 10 
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Appendix B: FAE_i sensitivity analysis results 
 
Figure B-1 FAE_i sensitivity analysis results I 
 
Figure B-2 FAE_i sensitivity analysis results II 
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Appendix C: WOMi sensitivity analysis results 
 
Figure C-1 WOMi sensitivity analysis results I 
 
 
Figure C-2 WOMi sensitivity analysis results II 
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Appendix D: Learning curve strength sensitivity analysis results 
 
Figure D-1 Learning curve strength sensitivity analysis results I 
 
 
Figure D-2 Learning curve strength sensitivity analysis results II 
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